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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I tested the effects of three proxies for venture capitalist (VC) reputation on 
its invested company’s long term industry-adjusted operating performances (ROA , 
ROE), market-to-book ratio and survival time (time to delisting) in the aftermarket. VC’s 
market share and VC’s IPO share have strong and positive association with the post-IPO 
long-term performance metrics, and the effects are statistically significant even after 
accounting for self-selection bias. For long term survivorship of start-up companies, I 
applied hazard analysis to the IPO company’s time to delisting with accelerated failure 
time (AFT) model as the baseline hazard function, and found that start up companies with 
backing from higher VC’s market share and VC’s IPO share VC firms tend to have lower 
hazard rate of de-listing. The expected time to delisting is also found to be much shorter 
in the pre-technology bubble period (1985-1996) compared to during and post-
technology bubble period (1997-2007) for higher than median value reputable VCs. As 
the findings are robust even after controlling for business expansion and contraction 
cycles, this lend credence to the idea that during the technology bubble period, over   4
optimism in VCs and too much uncommitted capital chasing after too few quality deals 
have resulted in reputable VC investing in mediocre quality companies. By cross-testing 
the effects of different quartiles of VC reputation proxy rankings on the long-run 
survivorship of the companies, VC market share is found to be the most consistent and 
effective amongst the proposed VC reputation proxies in explaining its effect on the IPO 
companies’ long-run survival.
1 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
  The subject of post-IPO performance and survivorship of new issuers in the 
capital markets has been a topic of great interest since Ritter’s (Ritter, 1984) exposition 
on the potential wealth hazards of a buy-and-hold strategy in IPO investment. These 
hazards served to highlight the asymmetric information present in the capital markets and 
provide opportunities for reputable financial intermediaries to leverage their reputation 
and obtain competitive advantages (Kreps & Wilson, 1982; Shapiro, 1983). This 
reputation effect has been theoretically modeled to be important (Holmstrom & Tirole, 
1997) and empirically researched to be critical in areas such as underwriter’s reputation 
in IPO issues (R. B. Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998).  
 
  Venture capital is defined as self-determining, professionally managed, 
committed pools of capital that center on equity or equity-linked investments in privately 
held, high and internally growth companies (P. Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Compared to 
more traditional modes of capital financing such as debt financing by banks, VC 
financing is still considered a relatively nascent mode financial intermediation, but its 
vital role in creation of public companies has been a topic of interest within academic 
circles (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & Vetsuypens, 1990; Lerner, 1994b). Through 
intimate participation and leveraging their knowledge in screening, monitoring, decision-
making and support functions in the pre-initial public offering (IPO) stages, VCs 
investing in their specialized industries can utilize their knowledge, networks and   2
management know-how to effectively assist the entrepreneurs in strategic, financial and 
operational planning (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Macmillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989). 
 
  Given the critical nature of venture capital (VC) advisory services and the risk 
they undertake by supplying capital to privately-held and usually young high technology 
companies [In UK market, 34% of informal venture capital investments exits at a loss 
and 12% exits at a partial loss or break even (Mason & Harrison, 2002) ], the VC 
reputation effect should be an important factor in influencing its investment opportunity 
set and its selection. Yet, extant literature has shown that scant research has been done in 
the area of VC reputation and its effect on the performance metric of its vested 
investments in their portfolio companies.  
 
1.2 The Relevance of VC Reputation and Proposed Study 
  This study proposes to investigate in depth VC’s reputation effect on its invested 
companies long term performance and survival being the early stages in public markets. 
Most of the current literature in VC research emphasizes the value-add proposition of 
VCs beyond traditional financial intermediation and the hypothesis of VC certification 
value suggests that when the difficulty of observing directly the quality of a early stage 
entrepreneurial company arises, the performance and quality of the company’s affiliates 
as a signal of the quality of the start-up company itself (Megginson & Weiss, 1991), 
which in this case are the VC firms that provides private financing. Apart from providing 
certification value, the network or keiretsu effect that a VC firms possesses due to its 
unique position of being common investors to a portfolio of firms, allows it to be able to   3
spot joint ventures or strategic alliances opportunities between its financially supported 
start-up companies (Lindsey, 2002). By estimate the effect that reputable VCs have on its  
invested companies’ long-run performance, the value-add in a reputable VC’s advisory 
services and network can be quantified in the company’s superior performance over one 
that is not backed by reputable VC.  
 
  As explained, the benefits for a prospective start-up company to associate with a 
reputable VC are apparent, i.e. the VC certification value, Keiretsu or networking and 
VC’s value added advisory services. Most of the existing literature, however, assumes 
homogeneity within the VC sample set and ignores the potential heterogeneity in the 
quality of VCs. An exception is an empirical research piece conducted by Gompers (Paul 
A. Gompers, 1996) that conducted studies into the relationship between the reputation 
magnitude of VCs and the under-pricing in the IPO of its portfolio companies. It is found 
that young VC firms, presumably with less than an established reputation, have a 
tendency to grandstand, i.e. young firms would be willing to the incur the cost of not 
maximizing value of the issuing company by bringing the company public earlier, such as 
to signal the VC’s ability and append its reputation base. This provides belief in the 
potential heterogeneity in the quality of the venture capital firms distinguishable from one 
another. 
 
  Owing to the lack of commonly accepted reputation proxy measures for VC 
firms, most of the existing research studies have focused on the VC’s role and value-add 
on its start-up firms without any distinction on the VC’s relative standing in its industry   4
in terms of experience, visibility and depth of funding strength. A prominent VC firm 
such as Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers may be indistinguishable from a newly formed 
VC firm in terms of its advisory value it can provide to its portfolio of start-up 
companies. In comparison to the research that has been conducted on equity issuing and 
underwriting studies, where large amount of research work has been conducted on the 
influence of underwriters reputation effect on the issuing firms
2 and valuable findings 
concluded, this actually imply the latent value and benefits that can be gleaned from a 
reliable VC reputation proxy with consistent and significant effects on the long-run 
operating performance and survivorship of the venture backed company in the post-IPO.  
 
Hence, in order to take the research in venture capital studies one step further, one 
major goal of this paper is to incorporate VC reputation proxies in the empirical study to 
measure the strength in the association between these proposed VC reputation metrics 
and its invested companies’ performance and survivorship. I am able to find consistent 
and strong association between higher VC reputation proxies’ value and better long-run 
performance metrics and survivorship of the VC invested companies. This indicates the 
effect of venture capital reputation is not trivial in explaining its portfolio company’s 
performance and survivorship in the post-IPO when the VC has long exited from its 
vested capital. As such, the advisory, certification and network value that a reputable VC 
is able to render to its portfolio company can be seen as critical providing it with a 
decisive advantage in terms of performing better and surviving longer in the post-IPO. 
                                                 
2 Notable research studies in underwriter reputation effect on IPO company performance include “Initial 
Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation” by Carter and Manaster (1990),  “Underwriter Reputation, 
Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks” by Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and 
“Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?” by Loughran and Ritter (2004).   5
 
In terms of measuring and quantifying a VC’s achievements and reputation for 
comparison, an attractive approach to measure VC performance will be to focus on 
ability to help achieves IPO success in its vested set of companies, measured by future, 
post-IPO long term operating performance and the company’s long-run survivorship. The 
use of the company’s post-IPO success is appropriate as it has been readily used in other 
research studies due to the ease of measurement and readily available data over public 
financial databases
3. It is also reasonable that, VC firms with prior strong records of 
bringing their portfolio companies to a profitable exit via IPOs will likely to attract 
stronger investors’ interests in their future IPOs, due to their repeated successes. This 
allows the VC firm easier access to better future investment opportunities and at more 
advantageous terms due to higher demand for their advisory services (Hsu, 2004), and 
increases the likelihood of a successful IPO exit with lower risk to its vested capital (due 
to lower price paid), enabling the VC firm to earn better returns and eventually achieving 
a better reputation.  
 
With the reasons stated above, three promising VC reputation proxy measures are 
selected for analysis. Similar to underwriter reputation proxy used in Megginson and 
Weiss exposition (Megginson & Weiss, 1991),  I used VC market share of bringing the 
private start-up company public as one of the reputation measure proxies for capturing a 
                                                 
3 Jain and Kini (1995) find that venture capitalist-backed IPO firms exhibit relatively superior post-issue 
operating performance compared to non-venture capital-backed IPO firms and that the market appears to 
recognize the value of monitoring by venture capitalists as reflected in the higher valuations at the time of 
the IPO. This lends weight to using after market success of the venture backed IPO company to measure 
the VCs skill and ability to provide value-add to the company in the pre-IPO. 
   6
VC’s relative ability and standing amongst its peers in its success to bring its portfolio 
firms to public markets. A variation of VC’s market share using VC’s IPO investments as 
a proportion of its total investments over a period time is used as the second measure of 
the VC’s deal making capability and stature as IPO exits are usually the most profitable 
for the VCs and their limited partners. For the third proxy for VC reputation, I utilized 
Gompers (Paul A. Gompers, 1996) and Lee & Wahal (Lee & Wahal, 2004) reputation 
proxy in their VC grandstanding studies that suggested VC firm age as an appropriate 
measure for VC reputation. I note that these reputation proxy measures are also employed 
as alternative reputation measures in a current working paper by Ivanov, Krishnan, 
Masulis & Singh  (Ivanov, Krishnan, Masulis, & Singh, 2008). 
 
With the identification of appropriate VC reputation proxy measures, the next step 
in my research study was to associate the VC reputation proxy measures with long-term 
IPO issuer performance and long-run listing survivorship. Post-IPO performances is 
measured by industry-adjusted operating performances (ROA and ROE), market-to-book 
ratio, and long term survivorship is measured by the period of time from IPO issuer first 
listed on the exchange till the time it de-lists. There is, by common VC industry practice, 
a lock-up period of half a year ( for partial exit and usually full year of lock up for full 
exit) which acts as a commitment device to minimize the tendency for general partners in 
VC firms from grandstanding (P. Gompers & Lerner, 1998) and to alleviate information 
asymmetry between the principal and agent which is usually greatest during IPO exits 
(Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003). So, the criticality of long term post-IPO performance 
and the survivorship of the IPO issuer backed by VC cannot be understated as they are   7
relevant to all the stakeholders of the venture capital investment. For the shareholder-
entrepreneurs, it can be deciding factor in whether the cost of association with reputable 
VCs is justified to allow it in gaining access to VC expertise in building the organization 
and professionalize its start-up company (Hsu, 2004; Thomas & Manju, 2002) beyond 
traditional financial intermediation of gaining access to funds. For the limited partners of 
the business venture, the long term performance and survivorship of the venture backed 
company further provides information to alleviate the information asymmetry inherent in 
the certification value of reputable VCs (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003) as this study 
directly associates the long-run success of the VC invested company in the after market 
with its  reputation level. This can be valuable in allowing the limited partners to increase 
their chances in selecting the appropriate VC fund to participate and optimize their 
returns on investment. For the general partners of the venture firm, by being able to 
quantify the VC firm’s reputation level and its effect on its portfolio company’s long-run 
performance and survival, they will be able to make informed decisions on whether the 
efforts and costs to obtain better reputation will be correlated to better performances of its 
portfolio of start-up companies and consequently more successful and cheaper fund 
raising, better rate of future successful IPO exits and increases in its returns on 
investments.  
 
1.3 Thesis Outline  
In the following chapters, the broad research objectives and its summary of 
contents are as follows:  
   8
In chapter 2, the data sample set and primary test methodologies utilized in this 
research study are explained. This includes discussion in detail on the data sources and 
filters in obtaining the IPO sample data set for the testing period from1985 to 2007. The 
VC reputation proxy measures, post-IPO operating performances and survivorship 
variables and the selection of control variables are also explained in depth. A detailed 
treatment on the survival analysis methodology with AFT as baseline hazard function is 
also discussed to facilitate basic understanding for the IPO issuer long-run survivorship 
testing done later in the chapter 5. 
 
In chapter 3, the descriptive test statistics and empirical test results of our IPO 
sample set are presented. To verify that the sample set of VC backed IPO investments 
from our study is correlated to literature findings of the positive influence of VC’s 
networking and value-add have on its IPO issuing companies over non VC backed IPO 
issuing companies (Bharat A. Jain & Kini, 1995; Lindsey, 2002; Thomas & Manju, 
2002), I first tested that our sample set of VC backed IPO investment does in fact 
perform better than non VC backed samples from the same period, by regressing the 
long-run operating performance measures against VC and Non VC backed characteristics 
of the IPO issuing companies. This indicates that our VC backed IPO investment sample 
set is viable for further testing as the preliminary testing results do correlate with the 
current extant literature findings.  
 
To learn more about the characteristics of IPO firms backed by VCs of different 
reputation levels, a cross sectional regression for the VC reputation proxy measures   9
against the chosen control variables are conducted.  This is important to validate that the 
IPO issuer characteristics controlled are critical to the post-IPO performance analyses. By 
establishing this groundwork, it then allowed us to conduct the test to assess the 
explanatory power of the selected VC reputation proxy measures by checking if the 
prediction of better post-IPO operating performance and market-to-book ratios are 
significantly associated with higher values in the proxy measures of the respective 
proposed VC reputations. From these series of tests, I am able to also assess the relative 
strengths and explanatory powers of the different VC reputation proxies in its association 
to better long term operating performances of the VC supported IPO issuing companies.  
 
In chapter 4, the results of the robustness test is presented by applying the two 
stage Heckman’s correction method (Heckman, 1979) to account for the potential self 
selection bias of more reputable VCs, which can argued to have access to better 
investment opportunity set and more promising private start-up companies (Lee & 
Wahal, 2004; Sorenson, 2006). I am able to find that, even after accounting the potential 
self selection bias, the proposed VC reputation measurement proxies are still statistically 
significant in its explanatory power to show that the more reputable VC’s non traditional 
financial intermediation role provides valuable advisory and professionalization services 
to its portfolio of start-up companies.  
In chapter 5, survival analysis is conducted on the IPO issuing companies using 
survival analysis through hazard rate modeling that have been widely used in bio-medical 
sciences, and have in recent times found applications in finance research studies. Through 
survival analysis with AFT as the baseline hazard model function and additionally   10
controlling for business contraction and expansion cycles as determined by National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), I am able to compare between IPO issuers 
backed by VCs of differing reputation measurements listed at different time frames and 
operated in the public space for different length of time. We further segregated the 
survival analysis into time period splits to test for the VC reputation effect and IPO issuer 
survivorship during the pre-technology bubble period and during and post-technology 
bubble period. This is to account for the alleged effect of overvaluation and over 
optimism in investment sentiment towards high technology equity offerings during the 
latter period. We also conducted tests with quartile splits on VC reputation proxy 
measurements to check for differences in the sensitivity of the different VC reputation 
proxies by cross comparing the top versus bottom quartiles and 3
rd versus 2
nd quartiles 
VC reputation effects on the IPO issuers’ long term listing survivorship.  
The final chapter summarizes and concludes the findings in our study.  11
Chapter 2: Data Description and Methodology 
2.1 IPO Sample Set 
  Our IPO sample set comprises U.S IPOs offered for the 1985 – 2007 period. The 
IPO issuing details are extracted via Thomson Financial’s Security Data Corporation’s 
(SDC) Global New Issue database. Pertinent information extracted from the database 
include filing , offer and issue dates, company incorporation date, original filing high and 
low offer prices, IPO principal amount offered, lead and co-underwriter details, VC 
investors details in the IPO issuer and total  amount invested by VC firms in the IPO 
issuer.  
  The individual IPO issuer is then tracked until the end of 2007 on the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to determine if it continues to trade or fails. 
IPO issuer-related data including issuer net operating income, total assets, book value of 
equity, outstanding number equity shares and equity prices are also obtained from the 
Compustat database. We excluded from our dataset:  
1) IPO offer price less than 5 dollars or small offerings that raised less than 5 million 
dollars at the IPO,  
2) Stocks not listed on major exchanges or reported in the CRSP database,  
3) Unit offerings, Reverse leveraged buy-outs (LBO), spinoffs and carve-outs.  
  Non-operating companies such as REITs and closed-end funds, offers priced 
below 5 dollars are usually subject to anti-fraud provisions and small issues less than 5   12
million dollars usually require less stringent disclosure rules and also because less 
information are available for them (Ivanov et al., 2008), they are hence excluded. 
Omitting IPO offerings with less than complete information set, we are able identify 1876 
venture backed IPO issuers for the 1985-2007 period for testing.  
  On survivorship of the IPO issuers in the post-IPO, the research focus on 
survivorship is consistent with the notion of the firms that continue to operate 
independently as public corporations. Firms that are delisted from the trading exchange 
due to negative reasons or are acquired are categorized as non-survivors.  This is 
consistent with previous studies that have been conducted on firm survivorship (Hensler, 
Rutherford, & Springer, 1997; B. A. Jain & Kini, 2000) which used companies delisted 
for negative reasons as proxy for failures. Hence, companies with CRSP delisting codes 
for negative reasons that include bankruptcy, insufficient capital, insufficient float 
liquidation, failure to meet financial guidelines to list, insufficient number of market 
makers, nonpayment of fees or delinquent in filings, price falling below acceptable 
levels, insufficient number of shareholders are considered to be non survivors.  
  The decision to treat acquired firms as non survivors is based on research studies 
that suggest such firms are typically distressed and suffer from declining stock price 
performance prior to the acquisition (Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). The exclusion of 
acquired firms also allows us to focus the research on firms that continue to operate as 
independent public entities.  
   13
2.2 Assessment of VC Reputation Proxy Measures 
  This paper, as been briefly mentioned in the introduction chapter, proposes three 
proxy measurements for VC reputation, namely:  
1) VC Market Share  
2) VC IPO Share 
3) VC firm age   
  As the research objective is to examine the strength of association between these 
VC reputation proxies and the venture backed IPO issuers’ long term performances and 
survivorship, the VC reputation proxies need to be treated in a careful manner.  
  One complexity to VC reputation proxy measurements is that the VC funding of 
start-up companies usually occurs in syndicates. VC syndication helps to disseminate 
information across industry sector borders and expands the locus of exchange which 
improves the diversification value of their investments
4 (Olav & Toby, 2001). Similar to 
what has been employed in a working paper by Ivanov, Krishnan, Masulis & Singh 
(Ivanov et al., 2008), we aggregated the VC syndicate reputation as the average 
reputation across all the VCs investing in start-up company. This approach takes in 
account the past performance (since we are to take a three year average value of past 
                                                 
4 In other notable studies on VC syndication, Lerner (Lerner, 1994a) finds that apart from diversifying the 
risks of funding the staged capital infusion all by themselves, VCs, especially in the early stages of funding, 
prefers a partner VC who is on similar level or higher level of experience as a legitimate “second opinion” 
on their target entrepreneurial company due to the risks entailed. Metrick (Metrick, 2007) also notes that 
commonness of syndication varies over time, depending also on external conditions such as relative supply 
of capital. Syndication is more prevalent in pre-boom period than in boom periods as it is more profitable to 
go alone when the flow of capital into the VC industry is high.  
   14
performance) of all the VCs that are vested in the portfolio company. We omitted the 
usage of the lead VC as the key barometer to the VC reputation of the syndicate due to 
the limitation that the lead VC can change across different funding rounds which might 
potentially confound and reduce our viable sample set of IPO issuing companies.  
  To make sure that we do not over appraise the explanatory powers of VC 
reputation proxy measurements due to the influence of underwriter reputation effect, we 
also take pains to make sure the underwriter reputation (Carter-Manaster scale) is 
included in our regression model to avoid any false attribution to the VC reputation 
effect. The long term post-IPO performance measures in this study are estimated over the 
first 3 year period after the IPO issuer offering. But to minimize the survivorship bias in 
this study, we also included firm performance for IPO issuers with less than 3 years of 
listing period.  
  The proposed VC reputation proxies are formally defined as follows:  
VC Market Share:  This is calculated by taking the VC’s dollar market share of its 
venture backed IPOs weighted to the total dollar size of all venture backed IPOs for the 
immediate preceding 3 calendar years. For example, to analyze the long-run performance 
of an IPO issue in 2000, the VC market share is the aggregation of the dollar value of all 
IPOs backed by the VC funding the IPO issue in question during 1997,1998 and 1999 as 
proportion of the total dollar size of all venture backed IPOs for 3 year period. The dollar 
size of an IPO is obtained as the gross proceeds from the offering.   15
VC IPO Share: As earlier stated that IPO exits are usually the most profitable option for 
VCs to divest from their vested capital in their portfolio of start-up companies, the VC 
IPO share is calculated to measure proportion of successful VC exits using the IPO route. 
It is calculated as proportion of VC’s investments in IPO issuers in the 3 calendar years 
prior to the IPO in question, to the VC’s total investments over the same period.  
VC Firm Age: This third VC reputation proxy measurement assumes that the longer the 
VC firm has operated the more experience and expertise it has gathered, and has access to 
better investment opportunity set and makes superior selection decisions. The VC firm 
age, hence, will be calculated from the date of incorporation for the VC to the date of IPO 
offering for IPO in question. This follows the VC reputation proxy measurement 
suggested in VC grandstanding studies by Gompers (1996) and Lee & Wahal (2004)
5 
 
2.3 Post-IPO Long-run Performance Measures 
  In this research study, the three measures of post-IPO long-run performance 
metrics used are: industry-adjusted operating return on assets (ROA), industry-adjusted 
operating return on outstanding equity (ROE) and market-to-book ratio. The ROA and 
market-to-book ratio are standard measures widely used in existing literature (Paul A. 
                                                 
5 Gompers (1996) finds that young venture capital firms take companies pubic earlier than older venture 
capital firms in order to establish a reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds and companies 
backed by young venture capital firms tend to be are younger and more underpriced at their IPO than those 
of established venture capital firms. Moreover, young venture capital firms have been on the board of 
directors a shorter period of time at the IPO, hold smaller equity stakes, and time the IPO to precede or 
coincide with raising money for follow-on funds.  Lee and Wahal (2004) also finds consistent underpricing 
by younger VC firms and venture capital backed IPOs experience larger first-day returns than comparable 
non-venture backed IPOs. 
   16
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Bharat A. Jain & Kini, 1995), with ROA focusing on 
the profitability per dollar of assets while market-to-book can be seen as the growth 
projection of the company, not unlike a real option value of the company.  ROE is used 
as a variation to ROA to gauge the VC reputation effect on the rate of return on the 
ownership interest of the common stock owners in terms of profitability per outstanding 
common share. 
  The first measure, ROA, is the industry-adjusted rate of return on assets, defined 
as Net Income (NIQ) divided by Total Assets (ATQ) minus industry median ROA, and 
taking average for first three years following the IPO. Each IPO issuer is matched to their 
respective sample of companies based on the 4 digit SIC code, by deducting the sample 
companies’ median ROA off IPO issuing company’s ROA to account for the industry 
effects.  If the IPO issuing company do not survive beyond 3 years, the maximum 
number of quarters data available in is taken and matched against the industry median 
ROA for the same number of quarters to account in the attempt to minimize survivorship 
bias. The data, NIQ and ATQ, are taken off the Compustat Quarterly Database.  
  The second measure, ROE, likewise similar to the ROA, is the industry-adjusted 
rate of return on outstanding equity, defined as Net Income (NIQ) divided by the Total 
Common Shares Outstanding (CSHOQ) minus the industry median ROE, and taking 
average for the first three years following the IPO. The adjustment for industry effects 
and survivorship bias is similar to the ROA as above and data NIQ and CSHOQ are also 
taken off Compustat Quarterly Database.   17
  The third measure, market-to-book value is calculated as the ratio of the market 
value of equity to book value of equity. The market value of equity is defined as number 
of shares outstanding (CSHOQ) multiplied by its closing stock price for prior quarter 
(PRCCQ). The book value of equity is defined as total common/ordinary equity (CEQQ) 
plus net deferred balance sheet income taxes (TXDBQ), minus carrying value of 
preferred stock (Data 55).  Again, this is adjusted for survivorship bias similar to ROA 
and ROA for issuing companies that survived less than 3 years. Data CSHOQ, PRCCQ, 
CEQQ, TXDBQ and carrying value of preferred stock (Data 55) [in database of the old 
data format] are also taken off Compustat Quarterly Database. 
 
2.4 Methodology for Survivorship Study – Accelerated Failure Time Modeling 
  In the study of venture backed company survivorship in the post-IPO, I adopted 
survival analysis by using hazard rate modeling on the time to IPO issuer failure (de-
listing due to negative reasons or being acquired) for the VC invested companies that 
have gone public. As this methodology is my primary tool to analyze the VC reputation 
effect associated to its venture backed companies long-run survivorship, the hazard rate 
modeling utilizing accelerated failure time (AFT) baseline model bears some closer 
scrutiny.  
  Survival analysis involves the modeling of time to event data; where in our 
context of finance studies, bankruptcy or firm delisting can be considered an "event" in 
the survival analysis. Survival analysis has its roots in bio-medical sciences, and has in   18
recent times been argued in literature to be useful in modeling corporate failure (Keasey, 
McGuinness, & Short, 1990) and have since found broad applications in finance research 
studies to predict events such as bank and company failures
6 (Hensler et al., 1997; Lane, 
Looney, & Wansley, 1986).  
Jain and Kini (2000) note the main benefit of using survival analysis is that it 
avoids some problems arising from the cross sectional models such as multiple 
discriminant analysis and logistic regression to predict failure. Cross sectional regression 
models assume a steady state for failure process which is usually not supported in finance 
studies and the logit and discriminant models are hence only able to predict whether an 
event will occur but not when it will occur. Using survival analysis hazard models such 
as Cox hazard model or AFT model over the conventional logit/probit or discriminant 
analysis, however, produce estimates of probable time to failure, rather than just 
providing probability estimates of failure over the specified period of event study.   
An additional advantage of survival analysis is that it allows assessment of the 
conditional probability of failure given that the firm has survived up till the present time, 
as the models are able to deal with censored data which represents scenarios where the 
failure event has yet to occur and when each data set has different starting and ending 
time horizons. This is especially critical for a study such as the survivorship of publicly 
listed firms in the post-IPO period; our data sets are right censored since at any point in 
                                                 
6 In their seminal paper, Lane, Looney  & Wansley (1986) first applied survival analysis using Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model to bank failures and find the results comparable to discriminant analysis. 
Hensler et al. (1997) used accelerated failure time (AFT) model to investigate the effects of several 
characteristics suggested as indicators of firm survival for initial public offerings (IPOs) and find that the 
survival time for IPOs increases with size, age of the firm at the offering, the initial return, IPO activity 
level in the market, and the percentage of insider ownership.    19
time a large proportion of firms that have gone public are still in business and through 
survival analysis, we are able to compare between firms that are listed at different time 
frames and operated in the public space for different length of time.  
Hensler (1997) and Jain and Kini (2000) paper outlined the intuition behind 
hazard methodology in performing tests of the hypothesized determinants of IPO 
survivability, in which the basic Cox hazard methodology is used to determine the time-
dependent behavior of IPO survival, proxied by the length of time in which a firm 
remained listed in the post-IPO. The hazard function, H(t), in the context of post-IPO 
survival of firms is the conditional de-listing rate defined as the probability  of de-listing 
during a very small time interval (after IPO) assuming that the firm has survived to the 
beginning of this time interval. In terms of probability density function and cumulative 
distribution function, the hazard function can be written as:  
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Where H(t;X) is hazard function; f(t;X) is the probability density function on T (time in 
months that the IPO company has survived); F(t;X) is probability that an IPO with 
characteristics X has been de-listed before time t. 
The general form of the hazard model is 
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Where T = the length of trading period in months; T0(t) = Baseline hazard function 
describing the expected pattern of trading-period durations for a pool of IPOs that have   20
been publicly listed; X = vector of independent variables (covariates) hypothesized to 
affect length of the IPO firms’ trading period; β = Vector model parameters 
  The baseline hazard function describes the hazard probability distributions for 
IPOs de-listing for negative reasons under homogeneous conditions. If this is true, the 
Cox proportional hazard model can be employed, which is a fairly "simple" linear model 
that can be readily estimated by taking log on both sides in equation (2.2): 
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  This model is not based on any assumptions concerning the nature or shape of the 
underlying survival distribution and assumes that the underlying hazard rate is a function 
of the covariates. While no assumptions are made about the shape of the underlying 
hazard function, the model equation shown above does imply two assumptions. First, it 
specifies a multiplicative relationship between the underlying hazard function and the 
log-linear function of the covariates. This assumption is also called the proportionality 
assumption. In practical terms, it is assumed that, given two observations with different 
values for the independent variables, the ratio of the hazard functions for those two 
observations does not depend on time. The second assumption is that there is a log-linear 
relationship between the independent variables and the underlying hazard function 
(Kalbfleisch, 2002).  
These two assumptions might not be tenable in events such as delisting on IPOs 
as it might vary greatly between different public firms. For example, in both Hensler   21
(1997) and Jain and Kini’s (2000) papers, the failure distribution of IPO firms is shown to 
be non-monotonic and hence another baseline hazard model is needed to be employed. 
A variety of other hazard models are available and they differ mainly by the 
assumption regarding the shape of the hazard function. In both Hensler’s and Jain and 
Kini’s papers, the accelerated failure time (AFT) model was used. This is a parametric 
model which restricts the baseline function to follow an assumed density function based 
on deductive expectations. The AFT model is useful in situations when the covariates are 
assumed not to have a proportional effect on probability of the hazard event (in this case 
the delisting of an IPO firm) or when the hazard is restricted to follow a specific 
functional form (Smith, 2002). In other words, the usage of the AFT model allows the 
effect of the covariates to have non proportional effect on the time to failure, but rather it 
is able to accelerate or decelerate based on weighted importance of the covariates and its 
effect with length of trading time.  In its functional form, The AFT Model can be written 
as: 
()
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Where T, T0, X, β are previously defined in equation (2.2), e
ω is the baseline hazard 
function with a specified continuous density and σ is an ancilliary scale parameter which 
shapes the function.    22
Figure 2.1 illustrates the delisting frequency for our sample set of ventured back 
IPOs of the research study for the full period of 1985 -2007, sliced in quarter of a year. 
The peak period for de-listings is around the second year and shows declining trend there 
after. This suggests that the de-listing frequencies exhibit non-monotonic characteristics. 
Several density functions are usable as a functional form for the time period to 
IPO delisting, but both theoretical and empirical considerations justify a non monotonic 
function, as already shown in figure 2.1 where the peak period of delisting is in the 
second year. Theoretically, controlling for company age at IPO should lead to increase 
rate of de-listing as firms strive to succeed. And as firms take root in the industries, the 
delisting should decrease as time passes. This suggests the non-monotonic assumption is 
appropriate and is consistent with Hensley’s (1997) suggestion that the AFT model is 
appropriate for analysis of IPO delisting.  
  It is suggested that the log-logistic density function is a plausible functional form 
to model the baseline hazard function for non monotonic data distributions (Kalbfleisch, 
2002). The log-logistic baseline hazard model is shown to be: 
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Where λ, ρ are density parameters and t is the individual company failure time. It can be 
seen that if ρ >1, the log-logistic function is non-monotonic and the conditional 
probability that an IPO firm will be de-listed increases with time to a maximum and 
decreases after that, with the most probable delisting period to be:   23
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   These model parameters can be estimated using maximum likelihood method and 
the maximum likelihood estimates with λ = e
Xβ, ρ = 1/ σ (as denoted in equation 2.7);  the 
model appropriateness is tested using likelihood ratio test statistic computed as -2(ln L0 – 
ln Ln), where ln L0 is the maximum log likelihood of restricted model and ln Ln the 
maximum log likelihood of the estimated model (Hensler et al., 1997). The likelihood 
ratio statistic is asymptotically χ
2 distributed. 
  As there is the possibility that the duration data is right- censored, which means 
that the venture backed IPO companies in study continues trading through the entire 
study period without being de-listed. The estimation of such a model with censored data 
requires additional binary variable that denotes whether the observation is censored. By 
defining the censoring indicator as δ, the general form of the likelihood function is: 
∏
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Where ) ; ( i i i X t f and 1- ) ; ( i i i X t F  are already defined in equation (2.1) and c is a constant 
term that does not affect the maximum likelihood function. 
  A positive outcome from this hazard modeling study is that the AFT model 
allowed the analysis of the effect of more reputable VC (based on higher reputation proxy 
measurements selected in section 2.2) and its association with higher survival rates of its 
ventured back IPO companies, which implies that value-add of the advisory services in 
strategic, financial and operational areas provided by better VCs to their portfolio of start-  24
up companies are able make them more competitive and fitter to survive the long-run 
once they have gone public.  
 
2.5 Selection of Control Variables  
  As we need to measure the marginal effect in unit change of the VC reputation 
proxy value on the long-run issuer operating performances, selected issuer characteristics 
that might also influence the companies’ long-run performances and confound the VC 
reputation effect needs to be controlled for to segregate the VC reputation effect for 
analysis.  
 
  A common issuer characteristic used in previous IPO research studies is the 
natural logarithm of the gross proceeds from the IPO (IPO size). IPO size have been 
considered to proxy for the extent of information asymmetry regarding the prospects of 
the IPO issuer as higher proceeds raised at the offering signal lesser uncertainty regarding 
the future expected performance of the issuing firm(B. A. Jain & Kini, 2000). Hence, its 
inclusion is intended to control for any systematic influence due to offering size of the 
issue. As larger offerings are often made by more established and geographically well 
dispersed firms, the risks and uncertainty in the prospect of the company should be lower 
and investor would expect lower initial returns  (R. B. Carter et al., 1998). This data set is 
obtained from SDC New Issues database.  
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  In the seminal paper by Carter, Dark and Singh (1998), it is implied that the age 
of the issuing company (Age) can be used as a control variable for company age factor 
and was suggested to proxy for the risks of the IPO firm (Ritter, 1984). Older firms which 
have survived for a longer period of time remaining listed are deemed to have made 
fewer critical mistakes over the passage of time, have more tangible assets, have 
developed a competent management team and established strong customer connections 
which allowed it to weather adverse economic condition, and hence judge to be less 
risky. It is also documented that higher initial returns and more pronounced long-run 
underperformance are common for younger IPOs (Ritter, 1991). These findings highlight 
the potential importance of the Age factor in affecting the issuing companies operating 
performances and Age is incorporated in the regression model as one of the control 
variables. This data is obtained from SDC New Issues databases and when not available, 
collated from the company’s official website and taken as its natural logarithm.  
 
  The technology intensive firms, commonly backed by VC firms, have to be 
flagged because of the possibility of higher technological risks in terms of abandoned 
adoption for the said technology industry-wide and also of  its higher level of expected 
potential growth (Loughran, 2004). A binary indicator (Tech) to indicate that the issuing 
company is from a technology intensive industry is marked as 1 for technology based 
companies and 0 otherwise. Tech is useful as a control variable to capture the technology 
intensive industry characteristics. Sorting whether a company is technology based is 
straightforward—we simply classify an IPO company as Tech = 1 if SDC assigns that 
IPO a high tech industry classification flag and as Tech = 0 for the IPO company if SDC   26
does not. This high tech/non high tech industry demarcation is sorted according to the 
primary line of businesses based on North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS). A list of this primary business classified as technology intensive in SDC is 
provided in the Appendix B. 
 
  As the post-IPO performance of the issuers is likely to be influenced by the 
investment banking advisory activities before and after the IPO, a direct measurement of 
the underwriters’ effectiveness is not easy to identify (B. A. Jain & Kini, 2000). Similar 
to past studies, lead underwriter reputation have been used as a catch-all proxy to the 
investment banking value-add provided and many studies have found to have significant 
explanatory powers in explaining the initial and long-term IPO returns (R. Carter & 
Manaster, 1990; R. B. Carter et al., 1998). Adopting the same approach, we will proxy 
the lead underwriter’s reputation (Underwriter) by the Carter-Manaster 9 point scale, 
obtained from Professor Ritter’s web site at: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
This is used to control for the underwriter’s value-add effect on the going public process 
such as not to mix up the VC reputation effect which is our main focus in this study. To 
further capture and segregate the influence of important external activities of the going 
public process on the issuing firms long term performance, we also included a proxy to 
control for the success level of the pre-IPO road show (Roadshow) which takes on the 
value of 1, 2 or 3 depending on whether the offer price is below, within or above the 
initial filing range respectively.  
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  In our survivorship testing, in order to control for the business contraction and 
expansion cycles, I also included one more independent variable (Bcycle) for testing, a 
binary indicator with 1 for an IPO issued during business cycle expansion and 0 during 
business cycle contraction. This is taken off NBER’s online database which defines 
economic expansion and contraction dates for the US economy
7. 
                                                 
7 The business cycle dates are extracted from: http://wwwdev.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. NBER 
define a recession as a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more 
than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and 
wholesale-retail sales. Hence, these contractions (recessions) period are measured from the start at the peak 
of a business cycle to end at the trough of a business cycle. Our research study period have two business 
contraction cycles, from July 1990 to March 1991 and from March 2001 to November 2001, lasting 8 
months on both occasion. 
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Chapter 3: Empirical Results 
  Following the discussion in the previous chapter on the data and the methodology 
to be used for our testing of the VC reputation proxy effect on the venture backed IPO 
company’s long-run performance, this chapter documents the empirical results from the 
our testing. First, a discussion on the summary statistics of our sample IPO dataset and its 
control variables is warranted. 
3.1 Summary Statistics 
  Table 1 provides the industrial composition of venture-backed IPOs with High 
Tech and Non High Tech Splits for our IPO sample set from 1985 to 2007. Based on the 
viable set of 1876 IPOs brought to public over this period, the ventured back IPOs are 
mostly in high technology industries (as defined by SDC using the NAICS classification), 
comprising 80.9% of the total sample set of the test period. Conventionally, VCs invest 
more prominently in high technology industries where information asymmetry is most 
significant and potential for maximum returns in investment to the VCs are the highest to 
justify the resource intensive cost of monitoring the companies, for example, via costly 
staged capital infusion (P. Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Paul A. Gompers, 1995). Based on 
Table 1, it is also note worthy that the highest proportion (38.9%) of venture backed high 
technology IPOs falls into business services category, which mainly comprises 
businesses that are involved in the internet services & software development industry, 
and majority of the sample IPOs are listed between 1995 – 2000 period, during the peak 
of the infamous “technology bubble” period.  The next two most popular venture backed   29
sectors are in Chemicals & Allied Products (16.7%) and Electronic, Electrical Equipment 
& Components (11.7%), and are mainly industries that support gestation of early stage 
companies that are involved in high technology, research and development (R&D) 
intensive type of business. These companies are also deemed to be highly risky due to the 
low cash-flows and uncertain future prospects in the early stages. Tying in to literature 
findings, VC investments in these high risk ventures are consistent with the finding that 
VCs invest in industries in which their expertise and ability to monitor and guide are 
most in demand (Barry et al., 1990), and to monitor these technology specific companies 
require niche and specialized skills only VCs with the requisite knowledge in the industry  
are able to provide (P. Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2006). This also 
provides an explanation on the industry composition distribution of investments made by 
VCs into high tech and non high tech companies shown in Figure 1, that the IPOs issued 
by VC backed high technology companies are much more focused on the industries as 
previously mentioned from spikes in the figure, while VCs investments in non high tech 
companies are more well spread out and leveled from the comparison in the same figure.  
 
  Table 2 illustrates the distribution of the delisted venture backed IPOs for high 
tech and non high tech firms in a cross sectional view for the IPO issue year versus 
period (number of years, Y) after the IPO is launched. Overall, 768 out of the 1876 ( 
40.4%) of the venture backed IPO issues in the sample set delisted on negative reasons 
over the period of our study (1985 to 2007). Anecdotally, from the start of the sample 
study in 1985 of 13 failed venture backed IPO issues (6 high technology and 7 non high 
technology issues), the total number of failed venture backed IPOs rises steadily and   30
peaks at 1995 with 94 failed IPO issues (79 high technology and 15 non high technology 
issues ), and continued to maintain elevated throughout the late 1990s and again increases 
to 70 (60 high technology and 10 non  high technology issues) in 1999, 67 (62 high 
technology and 5 non high technology issues) in 2000, at the height of the technology 
bubble. It is documented that the level of fund-raising was rising steeply in the late 1990s 
and the amount paid by VCs for the investments into new companies became 
unsustainably high which resulted in “money chasing deals” phenomenon (P.A Gompers 
& Lerner, 2004).  
 
  The proverbial bubble deflated on the much diminished profitable investment 
opportunity set in 2001, and the number of failed venture backed issues dropped to 6 (4 
high technology and 2 non high technology) in 2001 and have remained low thereafter till 
the end of the study period in 2007, indicating increased caution and selectivity in the VC 
investments.  This is further augmented by the data that 71.4%, 61.7% and 66.1% of the 
venture backed high technology IPO issues in 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively delisted 
(for negative reasons) within three years of the IPO. The earlier IPO issues before 1998 
mostly have less than 20% de-listing rate for the same period of time. It is also notable 
that the peak de-listing rate occurs at the third year after the IPO listing (13.2%) and 
gradually drops after the third year. This same trend is re-affirmed from the Figure 2 
using a more granular quarterly slicing on the IPO de-listing frequency, and this 
phenomenon coincides with Hensler, Rutherford  and Springer (1997) studies that used a 
much earlier sample data period of 1975 to 1984. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
this suggests a non-monotonic distribution in the IPO delisting frequencies of the venture   31
backed IPOs and allows appropriate fit to a log-logistic functional form for the baseline 
hazard function in the AFT analysis.  
 
  For a proper comparison between the still in trading listed ventured backed issues 
and the already delisted venture backed IPO issues, selected descriptive statistics for the 
VC reputation proxy measures and control variables are compiled for both still in trading 
and delisted venture backed IPO issues, presented in Table 3. A two-sample t-test 
assuming unequal variances are tested for the difference in means of the proxies as well 
as control variable measures between these two categories of IPO issues. Amongst the 
VC reputation proxy measures, it is found that the average VC firm age (16.97 years) 
backing the still in trading issues is larger than average VC firm age backing the non 
trading issues (15.70 years) and the difference is statistically significant. The VC market 
share and VC IPO share are slightly lower (2.62%, 8.85% respectively) for the venture 
backed companies that are still in trading when compared to non trading companies 
(2.65%, 10.22% respectively), they are not highly significant and hence these differences 
cannot be verified as definite. The average IPO size of the still in trading issues is 
significantly larger than the defunct issues with a difference of 9.977 million USD and 
the difference statistically significant; likewise the still in trading issues have been listed 
for a longer average duration than the defunct issues (9.87 years versus 5.79 years) and 
the difference statistically significant. There is similar evidence in literature on the long 
term over-performance of bigger IPO issues when compare against smaller IPO issues 
(Levis, 1993). This underscores the importance of IPO size as a control variable for the 
VC reputation proxy measures effect on the IPO issues’ long term performance. The   32
significant difference between the still in trading and defunct issues highlights the already 
known finding from the previous data tables that the IPO delisting frequencies peaks 
early after the IPO listing (3 years) and decreases after that.  
 
  Another important control variable to be controlled, the underwriter reputation 
proxied by Carter-Manaster scale, is shown be of higher reputation level for still in 
trading venture backed IPO issues than the delisted venture backed issues, and their 
differences are highly significant. This is in good agreement with the general findings in 
literature that there is less underperformance for IPO issues underwritten by more 
reputable underwriters due to lower under-pricing and hence these issuers achieved better 
expected long term performance (R. Carter & Manaster, 1990; R. B. Carter et al., 1998; 
Loughran, 2004). In this case, it is shown by lower attrition rate in terms of de-listing rate 
for our sample set. This highlights the importance of controlling for the underwriter 
reputation effect in the regression model. Also notable is the average asset size before 
offering for the still in trading issues are larger than the delisted issues (though not 
statistically significant). Other proposed control variables, including the technology 
indicator and road show success, show no significant difference between the still in 
trading and defunct issues.  
 
3.2 Operating Performance of VC Backed IPOs versus Non VC Backed IPOs 
  To achieve the purpose of this study in investigating the venture capital reputation 
effect on the companies’ long-run performance, it needs to be first preceded with the test   33
on our sample set of IPOs that VC’s active involvement in their portfolio of IPO 
companies, when compared against non VC backed IPOs, does provide value-add in 
monitoring and managerial services which allow these companies to experience superior 
post-IPO operating performance.  
  To address this issue, cross-sectional regression analysis is conducted with the 
post-IPO operating performance metrics (ROA, ROE and market-to-book) as the 
dependent variables and VC involvement (VC) [a binary variable with VC = 0 for non 
venture backed issues and VC =1 as venture backed issues], underwriter reputation, IPO 
size, age and technology flag on the IPO company (binary indicator) as the independent 
variables. These control variables used as covariates have previously been explained in 
Chapter 2. Newey-West heteroskedasticity robust and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
methodology will be applied to the cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
to minimize the standard errors of the coefficient estimates.  
  Table 4 shows the results of the parameter estimates and associated t-statistics 
with the aforementioned model: 
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  On both long term operating performance measures ROA and ROE, the VC’s 
involvement in bringing the company public is consistently positive and statistically 
significant in effecting these companies to perform better than the non venture backed 
companies, even after controlling for other control variables that potentially influence 
post-IPO operating performance. The market-to-book value is also associated with   34
positive and significant VC involvement in the IPO issues, implying that the market 
recognizes the VC monitoring and value-add. These findings are not surprising, given 
that many research findings have concluded similar findings, such as Jain & Kini paper 
(Bharat A. Jain & Kini, 1995) that found the monitoring and reorganization services 
rendered by VCs to have a value-adding effect on venture backed companies’ superior 
post-issue operating performances. Brav & Gompers study (Brav & Gompers, 1997) also 
found that the venture backed IPO issues do not suffer from underperformance due to its 
larger IPO size and there are stronger investors’ preference to invest in these venture 
backed issues, especially by institutional investors rather than individual investor. Field’s 
study (Field, 1996) has shown that long-run IPO performance is positively related to 
institutional holdings and this might explain the superior performances of venture backed 
IPO issues.  
  Likewise, this test also matches literature findings that superior long-run 
performances are positively associated with the quality of underwriters (R. B. Carter et 
al., 1998) proxied by the Carter-Manaster reputation scale. It is suggested that IPO issues 
underwritten by more reputable underwriters are less information asymmetric and suffer 
from less under pricing in such issues and hence are associated with higher initial returns. 
The superior long term operating performances are also positively and significantly 
associated with technology issues, and can be explained by the research findings that 
technology issues are usually highly information asymmetric (i.e. high technology 
companies with high market to book ratios) and its potential for maximum returns in 
investment are the highest (P. Gompers & Lerner, 2001). The association of operating 
performance with the IPO size and company age is uncertain from the outcome of this   35
test. 
  These findings correlate with the broad literature that long term operating 
performances and market-to-book ratio are positively associated to venture backing, 
underwriter’s reputation and technology issues. This permits us to further segregate and 
test for the VC reputation’s effect in influencing the IPO companies’ long-run 
performance and survivorship. I expect to see that through the more reputable VCs’ 
advisory, managerial and professionalization skills, they will provide more value-add 
than less reputable VCs to transform the IPO companies into better long term performers 
and survivors.  
 
3.3 VC Reputation and Characteristics of Issuers Brought to IPO Market 
  To learn more about the characteristics of the companies that are brought to the 
IPO market, cross-sectional examinations of the differences in the company 
characteristics backed by VCs of differing VC reputation proxy values are conducted on 
the sample set of venture backed IPO issues. As the reputation proxies are all left 
censored at zero, censored logistic regressions are applied to the following model for 
each of three previously defined VC reputation proxies (VC market share, VC IPO share 
and VC firm age): 
ε β
β β β β β
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  Table 5 displays the results of this regression test. The IPO issuers backed by 
more reputable VCs tend to be underwritten by more reputable investment banks, and the   36
results are consistent and significant across all three VC reputation proxy measures in our 
study. This seems to imply that the more reputable VCs might have preferential access to 
more established and higher quality underwriting services for bringing their supported 
entrepreneurial companies public. This also hints at the inter-organizational network 
effect that Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) discussed in their 
paper that better venture capitalist tend to function with more prominent affiliates and 
strategic partners, which potentially helps its supported companies to gain an edge during 
the going public process.  
  It’s also not surprising that the higher ranked VCs tend to be significantly 
associated with companies with smaller asset size and operates in the technology sector, 
as the coefficients for company asset size prior to IPO are estimated to be negative (and 
statistically significant) and estimated to be positive (and statistically significant) for 
technology companies. Small technology companies tend to be riskier in terms of being 
highly information asymmetric, and have capital intensive research and development 
operations. They usually are asset deficient and have low and uncertain cash flows. 
Hence, more reputable VCs, perceptibly to more savvy and skilful in its screening, 
staging and monitoring process, are thought to be more able than their less reputable 
peers to identify high, positive net value opportunities in young, entrepreneurial 
companies with new, promising technologies. More reputable VCs also tend to invest in 
young companies with shorter operating histories, but this finding is not highly 
statistically significant.   37
  As most of these characteristics have significant explanatory power on the VC 
reputation proxy measures, this highlights the importance of controlling for these issuer 
characteristics in our analysis of the VC reputation proxy effect on the post-IPO 
performances of the venture backed companies, and the results explained in the next 
section.  
 
3.4 VC Reputation and Issuer Long-run Issuer Performance 
  In this section, test results for association of long-run operating performance of 
venture backed IPO companies with the proposed VC reputation proxy measures are 
presented. The objective is to determine if the proposed VC reputation proxies have 
explanatory powers on the company’s post-IPO operating performances and to measure 
the relative effectiveness of our proposed reputation measures; that any one of the three 
VC reputation proxies is significantly better and consistent than the others in its effect on 
the long-run operating performance of the companies.   
3.4.1 Test on Issuer Long-Run Industry Adjusted ROA/ROE 
  I postulated that the post-IPO operating performance of IPO issuers backed by 
more reputable VCs will be superior to ones backed by less reputable VCs. To test this 
hypothesis, we used the following regression specification for the industry-adjusted ROA 
and ROE against our three proposed VC reputation proxy measures and control variables: 
ε β β
β β β β β
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   (3.3)   38
  The underwriter reputation, IPO size and technology indicator are shown in 
previous section to be important as control variables and are included in this regression 
model to allow better segregation of the VC reputation effect in the test. We also included 
IPO road show success indicator and company age as defined in Chapter 2 to be possible 
critical factors to the issuers’ post-IPO performance and are the additional control 
variables. Natural logarithm of the IPO size (in dollar value) and age (in years) are used. 
This test is conducted sequentially for each of the VC reputation proxy of VC market 
share, VC IPO Share and VC firm age to allow relative explanatory powers of the VC 
reputation proxy measures to be compared against one another by keeping the 
aforementioned control variables constant. An OLS regression is carried out on the 
proposed model and the standard errors adjusted for Newey-West HAC corrections. The 
coefficient estimates and the associated p-values are presented in panel A of table 6B. 
While all three reputation proxies showed that better VC reputation rankings are 
positively associated with better post-IPO industry adjusted ROA of venture backed 
companies, only VC market share and VC IPO share are statistically significant (within 
5% level) in its parameter estimates while VC firm age isn’t. With the explained variance 
highest for VC market share followed by VC IPO Share and lastly VC firm age (5.27%, 
4.09% and 3.41% respectively), this implies that the explanatory powers of VC market 
share may be greater than that of VC IPO share and VC firm age. Also within 
expectations, higher ROA on the post-IPO issuer is also significantly associated with 
more reputable underwriters and smaller IPO size. As shown in table 6A, the pair-wise 
Pearson’s correlation between VC reputation proxies and underwriter reputation is low, 
and the correlations are -0.126, 0.055 and 0.149 for VC IPO share, VC firm age and VC   39
market respectively. Hence the explanatory powers of VC reputation measures on 
operating performance are not a result of the VC reputation proxies merely acting as 
close substitutes for underwriter reputation. The VC reputation proxies tested allude to 
the superior value-add provided by reputable VCs in its advisory and intermediation 
services provided to their supported IPO issues have  beneficial effects  in the long-run 
profitability growth of these companies. 
  Likewise for the test on industry adjusted ROE, OLS regression is conducted with 
Newey-West HAC adjustments on the standard errors and the coefficient estimates as 
well as p-values are posted in panel B of table 6B. It shows similar results of VC 
reputation’s influence on the long-run ROE of the post-IPO issues with all the VC 
proxies having positive effect on the long-run issuer ROE in the post-IPO. VC market 
share as VC reputation proxy have the greatest explanatory powers in it effect on long-
run issuer ROE when compare to VC IPO Share and VC firm age as its coefficient 
estimate is most statistically significant (within 1% level as compared to 5% and 10% 
level for VC IPO share and VC firm age) and has the biggest explained variance (4.68%). 
VC IPO share as VC reputation proxy is second most effective (3.96%) in its explanatory 
powers of its effect on long-run ROE of the issuer while VC firm age, like the previous 
test on long-run ROA, has the weakest explanatory powers (3.29%). The long-run issuer 
ROE is positively associated with underwriter’s reputation, though only the regression 
model with VC market share as VC reputation proxy shows statistical significance for 
this underwriter reputation effect within 10 percent level. Also similar to previous test on 
long-run ROA, the long-run post issue ROE is associated with smaller IPO size and the 
coefficient estimates significant within 10 percent level for all three regression models.    40
3.4.2 Test on Issuer Long-Run Market-to-Book Ratio 
  Panel C on Table 6B shows the coefficient estimates and its associated p-values 
from the OLS regression with Newey-West HAC corrections on the standard errors. The 
regression specification is summarized as below:  
ε β β β
β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + = − −
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   (3.4) 
  Again, we tested for all three proposed VC reputation proxy measures of VC 
market share, VC IPO share and VC firm age on the long-run market-to-book of post-
IPO company. For all three VC reputation proxies, it is shown that better VC reputation 
rankings are associated with higher market-to-book ratio. All three coefficient estimates 
of the VC reputation proxies are significant within 10 percent level. The model with VC 
market share as VC reputation proxy has the highest explanatory powers (4.89%) 
followed by VC firm age (4.07%) and VC IPO age (3.57%). Like the previous two tests, 
the underwriter reputation effect is not trivial in explaining the higher market-to-book 
ratio from more reputable underwriting of the IPO issue. Larger IPO sizes are also 
significantly associated with lower market-to-ratios. As already explained in Table 6A, 
the correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO size with the three proposed VC 
reputation proxies are shown to be relatively low. Hence, this shows that the VC 
reputation proxies have reasonable explanatory powers to permit the inference that the 
more reputable VCs provide higher value-add to its supported companies, reduce 
information asymmetry to the public investors which result in higher valuations in the   41
form of higher long-run market to book ratios, and this suggest optimism on the future 
growth potential of these companies backed by more reputable VCs.   
 
3.5 Summary 
             Table 6B’s panel A,B and C have shown that all three VC reputation proxy 
measures to have positive influence on the venture backed companies’ post-IPO long-run 
operating performance and market-to-book ratio, though on varying degree of 
explanatory powers. VC market share have the greatest explanatory powers on the 
operating performance and market-to-book ratio, followed by VC IPO share and finally 
VC firm age.  In terms of economic significance, VC market share is the VC reputation 
proxy with greatest explanatory powers and after controlling for other issuer 
characteristics in the regression model, our model predicts that for one standard deviation 
increase in VC market share, it will result in 6.2% increase in long-run ROA increase, 
8.9% increase in long-run ROE and 13.7% increase for long-run market-to-book ratio. 
Hence, VC market share association with post-IPO issuer performance has clear 
economic implications. For VC IPO share and VC firm age, they are also economically 
significant in its relation to superior long-run operating performance, albeit with lower 
explanatory powers.  
            It is noteworthy to recognize that so far two different facets of the companies’ 
long-run performance have been looked into: average profitability and future growth 
potential. From the regression tests, the significance of the different control variables   42
cannot be understated as the most critical variables such as underwriter reputation and 
IPO size are consistent with literature understanding that the underwriting quality adds 
value to the long-run operating performance and market-to-book ratio (R. B. Carter et al., 
1998) and that larger IPO size is associated with lower issuer performance (Ivanov et al., 
2008). For other control variables such as firm age and technology, the overall 
association is inconclusive, but it is shown that the market associates technology 
companies with higher future growth potential, as the technology indicator is statistically 
significant and positively related to higher market-to-book ratio for all three models of 
different VC reputation proxies.    43
Chapter 4:  Robustness Test 
  The VC reputation proxy measures are shown to have positive and significant 
association with superior post-IPO issue operating performance, especially for VC 
market share which have been shown to have a non trivial economic significance. In this 
chapter, we subject these VC reputation proxies to robustness test in order to assess the 
strength of our findings even after controlling for self selection bias.  
4.1 Heckman Two Stage Correction Method for Self Selection Bias 
  Our previous findings of the VC reputation proxies being significant determinants 
of superior operating performance could potentially be a self selection effect of more 
reputable VCs having better access to more promising investment opportunity set
8, as 
already argued in papers by Lee and Wahal (Lee & Wahal, 2004) and Sorensen 
(Sorenson, 2006). Hence, the reputable VCs’ association with superior operating 
performance may be due to its access to better quality business ventures which it is able 
to invest, rather than through the VCs’ ability to add value through its advisory, 
intermediation and professionalization services. 
  In Ivanov, Krishnan, Masulis & Singh (2008) working paper, they argue that the 
issuer pre-IPO asset size, number of VC partners and offer price revisions to be good 
                                                 
8 Lee and Wahal (2004) used matching methods that endogenize the receipt of venture financing in order to 
miminize selectivity bias in their examination of the role of venture capital backing in the under pricing of 
IPOs.  They find venture capital backed IPOs experience larger first-day returns than comparable non-
venture backed IPOs. Sorenson (2006) is able to find that the selectivity effect is almost twice as important 
as influence for companies backed by more experienced VCs to go public 
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instrumental variables for capturing this self selection effect as these factors correlate 
with underlying firm quality at IPO date but are later unrelated in the post-IPO 
performance. As we are concerned only with the post-IPO long term performance, these 
factors proved to be difficult to control for in the selection of higher quality opportunity 
sets by more reputable VCs. However, in view of the importance to validate the value of 
reputable VC value-add and development of their portfolio of start-up companies, 
sensitivity test on the VC selection and screening of their invested companies is 
performed.  
  A two step modified Heckman (Heckman, 1979) procedure is  applied to control 
the VC selection process. The first step of the procedure allows us to capture the 
likelihood of a positive outcome of the dependent variable which is the higher than 
median rank VC reputation proxy measure (VC_Rep*) in our test.  This step is 
accomplished via a logit regression as similarly performed in Ivanov, Krishnan, Masulis 
& Singh’s paper (2008) by regressing the dependent variable on the issuer characteristics: 
ε β β β β β + + + + + = Tech Age Size r Underwrite p VC o 4 3 2 1 * Re _     (4.1) 
VC_Rep* is a binary indicator which shows 1 for higher than median rank VC reputation 
proxy measure and 0 otherwise. The parameter estimates are then used to compute the 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio for each of the three proposed VC reputation proxy measures, which 
is defined as ratio of the probability density function over the cumulative distribution 
function of a distribution. In its formulaic form, it can be defined as:    45
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Where x is a random variable distributed normally with mean μ  and variance
2 σ , α  is a 
constant,  (.) φ  denotes the standard normal density function, and  (.) Φ denotes the 
standard cumulative distribution function. The terms expressed within brackets [.] are the 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio (Greene, 2003).  
  The second step will involve adding the Inverse Mills’ Ratio as an additional 
independent variable (InverseMillsRatio) to the general regression models in equation 
(3.3) and (3.4) of the effect of VC reputation proxy measures on long-run operating 
performance and market-to-book ratio. The appended regression specification can be 
expressed as follows:  
ε β β β β β
β β β
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  (4.3) 
The Inverse Mills’ Ratio controls for the probability that more reputable VCs select 
higher quality business ventures, and hence corrects for the self selection bias on the 
original model which is without the inclusion of this additional explanatory variable. 
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4.2 Test Results 
  Table 7A represents the first stage regression estimates of the Heckman self-
selection bias correction procedure using logit regression and converged using quadratic 
hill climbing methodology. All three models with different VC reputation proxy 
measures have reasonable explanatory powers and hence appropriate as a prediction 
model for the Inverse Mills’ Ratio computation.  
  Table 7B represents the second stage regression estimates of the Heckman 
procedure with the general regression model augmented with an additional explanatory 
variable (equation 4.3), and that is the Inverse Mills’ Ratio as computed from the 
parameter estimates in the first stage.  As before, this regression model is conducted 
using OLS estimates with Newey-West HAC adjustment on standard errors to minimize 
any potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The result estimates of the 
regression of long-run operating performances ROA, ROE and market-to-book ratio 
against the three proposed VC reputation proxy measures are presented sequentially in 
panel A, B and C. Each of the coefficient estimates of the Inverse Mills’ Ratio on all 
three VC reputation measures model is negatively associated with the long-run 
performances and is statistically significant. This implies that the VC selectivity and 
sorting issue of reputable VCs having better access to higher quality entrepreneurial 
companies is present and this coincides with literature findings (Lee & Wahal, 2004; 
Sorenson, 2006). Despite the presence of the VC selectivity, there is higher value-add in 
the skills of more reputable VCs due to its stronger association with better long-run 
operating performance and market-to-book ratio. The interaction coefficients of the VC   47
reputation measures have positive effect on the long-run performance measures and are 
statistically significant within 5% level for VC market share and within 10% level for VC 
IPO share, while VC firm age is significant within 10% level for its positive association 
with ROE and market-to-book but not ROA. These results showed that via VC 
selectivity, experienced VCs invest in better companies, through a deliberate process of 
matching between VCs and start-up companies. Start-up companies needing VC capital 
care about the value-add that can be provided by the VCs, and when faced with multiple 
offers, these companies routinely turn down the VC with the best financial offer in favor 
of a VC that is more established (Hsu, 2004). However, this does not discount the 
influence that the more reputable VCs do add value in other ways to contribute to a better 
performing company in the long-run, as test results using the proposed VC reputation 
proxy measures, primarily VC market share, are able to significantly capture some of 
these latent information. It may be that reputable VCs, apart from acting as mere financial 
intermediary, also helped in building the supported companies’ organization, provide 
management know-how and professionalizes the outfit (Thomas & Manju, 2002; V, 
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). These value-adding measures go a long way in making the 
companies competitive and fit for the long-run.  
 
  On another note, the inclusion of the Inverse Mills’ Ratio does not affect the 
issuer characteristics’ influence on the long term operating performance and market-to-
book ratio, as critical control variables such as underwriter reputation remained positively 
associated to better long term performance of the companies and in most of the test 
series, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. Similar to previous series of   48
tests without the self selection bias correction, the long term performance of a VC backed 
company is negatively associated to the IPO size offered and the coefficient estimates 
statistically significant.    49
Chapter 5: VC Reputation and Issuer Long-run Survivorship 
  Thus far, this paper has been dealing with the long term profitability and growth 
potential in terms of long-run industry operating performances (ROA & ROE) and 
market-to-book ratio. The issue of long-run survivorship of a company in the post-IPO, 
which is the likelihood that the company will suffer from an event of severe financial 
distress and de-list for negative reasons, have not been discussed so far.   
  The aftermarket survivorship of an IPO is not new in literature, and our 
methodology explained in section 2.4 to utilize survival analysis with hazard function to 
predict company failure are represented in studies such as Keasey, McGuinness & Short 
(1990) and Lane, Looney & Wansley (1986), which respectively argued for the use of 
survival analysis in company failures in the former while the latter applied the 
methodology onto analysis of bank failures. The application of AFT model as the 
baseline hazard function for the survival analysis has been done by Hensler, Rutherford 
& Springer (1997) in their survivorship studies of aftermarket IPOs and by Jain & Kini 
(2000) in their survival profiling of VC backed companies versus non VC backed 
companies in the aftermarket. Even though the use of AFT modeling has been widely 
adopted, this paper’s application of AFT model to study VC reputation effect on the long-
run survivorship of its portfolio of companies in the after market is novel. 
  I re-iterate the two advantages of using this methodology to study the long-run 
survivorship of VC backed companies’ post-IPO survivorship. Firstly, it avoids the 
problems arising from the cross sectional models such as multiple discriminant analysis   50
and logistic regression of only able to predict whether an event will occur but not when it 
will occur. Survival analysis hazard models are able produce estimates of probable time 
to failure, rather than merely providing probability estimates of failure over the specified 
period of our event study. Secondly, survival analysis allows assessment of the 
conditional probability of failure given that the firm has survived up till the present time, 
and our proposed models are able to deal with censored data which represents scenarios 
where the company failure has yet to occur at the end of our study period, given that 
companies have widely differing listing and delisting time periods. The survivorship 
study of VC backed companies in the post-IPO period has in each point of time a large 
proportion of firms that have gone public and are still in listing. Hence using survival 
analysis, it can serve as a valid platform to compare between firms that have listed and 
operated in the public space at different point and length of time (B. A. Jain & Kini, 
2000).  
  The appeal of applying AFT model as the baseline hazard function in this survival 
analysis study is that, it can model the effect of the covariate value changes on hazard 
probability for different time periods according to the length of post-IPO trading time of 
the individual VC backed company. Hence, the effect of varying covariate values does 
not necessarily have a proportional effect on time to failure (de-listing), but can 
accelerate or decelerate depending on the importance of the specific independent variable 
and its length of listed period (Kalbfleisch, 2002). Our usage of the log-logistic functional 
form for the baseline hazard function is also appropriate, as already shown in Figure 1, 
that the de-listing frequencies of the VC backed companies is non-monotonic due to its 
peaking between the second and third year of IPO listing and the failure rate decreases   51
thereafter. This provides empirical justification for the use of the log-logistic functional 
distribution
9.  
5.1 Survivorship Test Model - AFT 
  In our model, I apply the natural logarithm of the response variable which in this 
case is the natural logarithm of the time to delisting of the individual companies in years, 
labeled Ln (Ht). The matrix of covariates respectively contains the binary form of the VC 
reputation proxies (Taking 1 if reputation proxy value is above the median value and 0 
otherwise), underwriter reputation, natural logarithm of IPO size (millions), natural 
logarithm of company age, technology indicator, IPO road show success indicator and 
finally, a binary indicator to represent business expansion or contraction at the time 
which the IPO is listed. All these variables have been defined in Chapter 2 earlier and 
more details are available in Appendix A. The baseline hazard function, which was 
specified in equation (2.7) to take a log logistic form, is abbreviated here as Ho and σ is 
the ancillary scale parameter. For simplification, we will represent our model in a linear 
form as follows: 
    (5.1) 
 
Where 
                                                 
9 Hensler et. al. (1997) notes that the usage of the log – normal distribution is also possible, but this model 
does not easily accommodate censored data such as dealt in our current sample set. The log-logistic model 
is hence considered as an appropriate substitute. 
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  The shape of the hazard function is affected by ρ  as the point of maximum 
probability of failure occurs earlier in time as ρ decreases (or as σ increases).The model 
parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood method using Newton-Raphson 
algorithm for convergence and the significance of the individual coefficient estimates 
tested using a χ
2-statistic.  
5.2 Survivorship Test for IPOs Listing 1985-2007 
  Table 8 summarizes the estimation results for the full sample set of the IPO 
duration in study from 1985 -2007. The above median VC market share reputation proxy 
(when VC_Reputation =1) is  highly significant (within 1 % level) in predicting longer 
time to delisting with its positive coefficient estimates and VC IPO share also shows the 
same trend with lower statistical significance (within 10% level). Unexpectedly, this is 
shown to be vice versa for above median VC firm age as it predicts shorter time to 
delisting for VC backed IPOs. On the effect of control variables, the underwriter 
reputation, which is critical in predicting long-run operating performance success, is 
shown to have positive economic significance for both models with VC reputation 
proxies using VC market share and VC IPO share, but has negative economic 
implications for VC age. The coefficient estimates are all statistically insignificant. The 
IPO size seems to have a negative effect on the companies’ time to delisting for all 
models and coefficient estimates statistically significant. Likewise, for all VC reputation   53
proxy models, the longer the companies has been around and if they are technologically 
inclined, the longer the companies will be able to survive; the coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant for company age factor and statistically insignificant for 
technology company indicator. The pre-IPO road show success seems to be another 
critical factor in predicting long-run survivorship as the interaction terms are positive and 
statistically significant in their coefficient estimates for all three models. A positive 
business cycle is negatively associated with company time to delisting but is statistically 
insignificant for all three models. The statistical insignificance is not surprising as from 
Jan 1985 to Dec 2007, there has been only total period of 16 months of business 
contractions on two separate occasions as defined by NBER which leads to very few 
sample points with negative business cycles, and a longer period of analysis which takes 
in accounts more sample points of business up and down-cycles; can then the business 
cycle effect on venture backed company delisting time be tested more vigorously. The 
ancillary scale parameter σ, is largest for VC IPO share, followed by VC market share 
and VC firm age, which implies the order of attaining maximum probability of time to 
failure first reached by the respective VC reputation proxy models. Unlike linear 
regression analysis, this coefficient estimates from the AFT model do not lend 
themselves to simple interpretation apart from the usage that it allows the general 
inference of its effect on the company’s post-IPO survival time.   
  Figures 3(a) – 3(c) illustrate the cumulative failure percentage of VC backed IPO 
firms versus time (years) for the respective models using only VC reputation proxies of 
VC market share (TIPOREP), VC IPO share (TVCREP) and VC firm age (TVCAGE) as 
model parameters in the AFT hazard function. Two curves are plotted for each figure,   54
one for above median VC reputation proxy and the other for equal or below median VC 
reputation and labeled as 1 or 0 respectively. As again, VC market share is the most 
consistent in predicting probability of failure as it shows that the above median VC 
reputation curve is consistently less risky in de-listing throughout the study period when 
compare against the cumulative failure curves of other VC reputation proxies’.  
  The maximum cumulative failure percentage attained by the equal or below 
median VC market share proxy is modeled to be 89.9% and for above median VC market 
proxy to be 87.1%. 25% of companies are expected to delist in 6.3 years and 7.2 years 
respectively for the equal or below the median VC market share IPO company and above 
the median VC market share IPO company; for 50% delisting at 9.7 years and 11.0 years 
respectively and for 75% delisting at 14.9 years and 16.9 years respectively. This shows 
that the VC with higher VC market share reputation proxy measurement tends to add 
more longevity to the company trading in public space and has positive implications on 
the value-add a more reputable VC can provide in their professionalization and 
management skills to build a strong organization for the venture backed company to 
survive longer in the aftermarket. Figure 3(b) shows that the VC IPO share has little or 
insignificant effect on the cumulative failure percentage plots with failure time as both 
curves for above median reputation and below or equal median reputation trend closely to 
each other. Figure 3(c) for VC firm age shows a direct opposite effect of what has been 
shown for VC market share, with above median VC firm age supported companies 
having significantly higher cumulative failure percentage versus time trend.  
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5.3 Survivorship Test for IPOs Listing 1985-1996 and 1997-2007 
  Section 3.1 summary statistics have confirmed what have already been publicly 
known as the technology “bubble” in the late 1990s where venture backed companies 
listed from 1997 -2000 have an abnormally high percentage of de-listings for within the 
first few years of the post-IPO trading period. This was explained to be a phenomenon of 
simultaneously having high levels of uncommitted investment capital being held by VCs  
and comparatively too few sound business venture opportunities which resulted in 
overvaluations and unsustainable prices for investments in mediocre quality companies 
during that period (P. Gompers & Lerner, 2000; P.A Gompers & Lerner, 2004). There 
were severe IPO under pricings from reduced incentives on the part of the companies’ 
principal investors, such as VCs, company insiders and investment banks, to hold on to 
the public stock in post-IPO once the lock-up period is over as these new listed 
companies hit skyrocketing valuations soon after they go public. The VC investors may 
also have been overly optimistic in these companies to perform well in the public markets 
(Alexander Ljungqvist, 2003) that they have no misgivings in paying a high price for 
these companies and then to relinquish ownership as soon as the lock up period is over in 
the post-IPO for quick returns.  
  With this understanding, this section splits the overall testing period into two 
different time frames and applies the same AFT hazard model for testing. The first testing 
period, which we termed as the pre-technology bubble period, is from 1985 – 1996, while 
the second testing period, which we termed as the technology bubble period (which also 
includes the post-technology bubble period), is from 1997 – 2007. The testing results and   56
figures are shown for the pre-technology bubble period in Table 9 and Figures 4(a) – 
4(c); and results for technology bubble period in Table 10 and Figures 5(a) -5(c). 
  Table 9 shows the parameter estimates for the pre-technology bubble period. The 
above median VC reputation proxies are positively and highly significant for both models 
with VC market share (higher statistical significance within 1% level) and for VC IPO 
share (lower statistical significance within 5% level). This implies that from 1985 – 1996, 
IPO companies with VC backing of higher than median reputation level (based on the 
two measures) are more likely to remain listed for a longer period of time than IPO 
companies backed by equal or lower than median reputation measure. Similar to previous 
section, the model using VC firm age as VC reputation proxy shows an opposite result 
with shorter listing time for companies backed by VCs with longer operating history. 
Unlike the full sample period tested in the previous section, the effect of the underwriter 
reputation is consistently positive and highly significant on longer venture company post-
IPO survivorship for all VC reputation models, which matches our understanding that the 
underwriter reputation add intangible value in terms of providing critical after market 
services in market-making and stabilization (B. A. Jain & Kini, 2000). Similar to our 
finding in previous section, on all VC reputation proxy models, IPO size has a negative 
and statistically significant effect while company age has a positive and statistically 
significant on the company’s listing period. All of the parameter estimates with high 
statistical significance are within 1% level. Technology driven companies have a positive 
effect of the listing period but the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. 
Road show successes are shown to have negative effect on the listing period but this 
might have be negated by the highly significant positive effect of underwriter’s reputation   57
as previously explained. Business cycle impact on company listing times, like previous 
test on the full sample period, is negative but statistically insignificant. The ancillary 
scale parameter σ, has the same order as the previous section with the largest for VC IPO 
share, followed by VC market share and VC firm age, and this implies the order of 
maximum probability of time to failure to be first attained by the respective VC 
reputation proxy models. 
  Comparing against Table 10, which shows results estimated for technology 
bubble period from 1997-2007, some interesting comparisons emerge. Instead of having 
positive effect on the VC backed companies’ listing period, the estimation models show 
that the above median VC market share and VC IPO share to have a negative but 
statistically insignificant effect on listing period of the companies, while for VC firm age, 
it has a negative effect on the company survivorship and coefficient estimates statistically 
significant. This implies that during the technology bubble of the late 1990s, even higher 
than median reputation VCs are not spared in making unsound investment decisions by 
being overly optimistic in their judgments on mediocre quality companies. The value-add 
in their advisory services to these companies are unable to overcome their earlier than 
expected delisting from the public markets, i.e. the well accepted idea of VC certification 
hypothesis to reduce information asymmetry to public investors as a signal of quality 
(Megginson & Weiss, 1991) during the technology bubble might not have been as 
effective. Underwriter reputation also has a negative but statistically insignificant effect 
on the delisting period of the VC backed companies, which is another signal of failure in 
the certification hypothesis due to reputable underwriters underestimating the risks and 
quality of the venture backed companies during this bubble period. This phenomenon is   58
atypical as Loughran and Ritter (2004) pointed out that, historically, prestigious 
investment banks do not underwrite offerings by high-risk issuer. IPO size, consistent to 
the previous period, has a negative and statistically significant effect on the survival 
period of the companies and the pre-IPO road show success also has a positive and 
significant influence on the companies’ survival in the after market. Technology 
companies, unlike in the pre-technology bubble period, are seen to have a shorter survival 
times but the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. The business expansion 
cycle has a positive by statistically insignificant effect on the company listing times. The 
ancillary scale parameters σ, are also estimated to be much larger during the technology 
bubble period compared to pre-technology bubble period, as an example, σ is measured 
to be 0.3627 and 0.0982 respectively in the two periods for the AFT model tested on VC 
market share. This means that VC backed companies in the technology bubble period 
consistently reach the maximum probability of time to failure much earlier and are hence 
expected to have a much steeper delisting rate than VC backed companies in the pre-
technology bubble period.  
 
  In comparing the cumulative failure percentage of VC backed IPO firms versus 
time (years) of the respective estimated AFT hazard models using only VC reputation 
proxy for the pre-technology bubble and technology bubble period, the survival 
probabilities between this two periods can again be cross-analyzed. Figures 4(a)–(c) and 
5(a)–(c) illustrate respectively the failure probability for pre-technology bubble and 
during the technology bubble period for VC market share (TIPOREP), VC IPO share 
(TVCREP) and VC firm age (TVCAGE) as model parameters in the AFT hazard   59
function. In the pre-technology bubble period, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that the above 
median reputation curves (TIPOREP =1, TVCREP =1) trends below the equal or below 
median reputation curves (TIPOREP =0, TVCREP =0), implying that the above median 
reputation VC backed IPO companies are delisted later in the post-IPO. This trend is seen 
to be reversed for the technology bubble period in Figures 5(a) and 5(b), where above 
median reputation VC backed companies are delisted earlier than equal or below median 
reputation VC backed companies. If we compare the rate at which companies are delisted 
for the two periods using the AFT model estimates with the most consistent VC 
reputation measure of VC market share; for above median reputation VC backed 
companies, it takes 15.6, 17.7 and 19.8 years respectively for 25%, 50% and 75% of the 
companies listed in the pre-technology bubble period to be expected to fail, while it takes 
5.0, 7.6 and 11.4 years respectively for 25%, 50% and 75% of the companies listed 
during the technology bubble period to fail. These findings are also fungible across VC 
IPO share and VC firm age as VC reputation models and the large differences in survival 
rates of the VC backed companies based on AFT model do highlight the contrasting 
qualities of the venture backed companies invested by above median reputation VCs 
across these two periods. This phenomenon, as earlier explained, may be a result of the 
effects in the excessive amount of investment capital raised from the VC funds that 
created a “money chasing after deals” scenario where exorbitant prices have been paid to 
acquire a stake in the diminishing investment opportunity set (P. Gompers & Lerner, 
2000); and in the reduced incentives for the VCs to properly monitor their business 
ventures as there are ample opportunities to taking profit once the lock up period is over,   60
owing to the fact that technology companies routinely attained high valuations soon after 
going public during the technology bubble period (Alexander Ljungqvist, 2003).  
 
5.4 Survivorship Test for Top Quartile versus Lowest Quartile and 3
rd Quartile 
versus 2
nd Quartile VCs 
  To further test the sensitivity of the VC reputation proxies in its effect on long-run 
survivorship of the VC backed companies, we further sub-divided the sample data set for 
the full period and grouped them into quartiles based on their individual VC reputation 
proxy values. Essentially, we created three different sets of quartile groupings based on 
the three proposed VC reputation proxy rankings and crossed tested using the same AFT 
hazard model. The quartiles for the individual reputation proxies are cut off based on 
their magnitude of the VC reputation proxy values at the 75
th percentile, 50
th percentile 
and 25
th percentile. The AFT hazard modeling is then conducted by comparing against 
the top quartile versus the lowest quartile rankings and the 3
rd quartile versus the 2
nd 
quartile rankings for each of the VC reputation proxy models. This is carried out by 
replacing the VC reputation proxy binary variable in the general model as 1 for top 
quartile ranking VC reputations and 0 for the lowest quartile ranking VC reputations in 
the first test, likewise for the second test the VC reputation proxy binary variable is 1 if 
the VC reputation rankings are in the 3
rd quartile and 0 if the VC reputation rankings are 
in the 2
nd quartile. The two tests, conducted for all three VC reputation proxy models, can 
serve as a sensitivity test on the magnitude of VC reputation proxy measures and its 
influence on the long-run survivorship of the IPO companies.    61
  The results for the two tests are shown in Table 11 (top versus lowest quartile 
IPOs) and Table 12 (third versus second quartile IPOs) from the AFT modeling of 
company delisting time with the respective VC reputation proxies and the control 
variables as presented in equation 5.1. The respective test of top versus lowest quartile 
IPOs and third versus second quartile IPOs are shown respectively in Figures 6(a)–(c) 
and 7(a)–(c) representing cumulative failure percentage versus time using only the 
individual VC reputation proxies of VC market share (TIPOREP), VC IPO share 
(TVCREP) and VC firm age (TVCAGE) as independent variables in the AFT modeling.  
  For model with VC market share as reputation proxy, it can be seen in both Table 
11 and 12 that the respective higher ranked quartiles have a positive effect on the long-
run survivorship of their VC backed companies in the aftermarket, and the coefficient 
estimates are of high statistical significance (within 1% level). This means the respective 
top quartile and 3
rd quartile ranked VCs with higher VC market share do have greater 
influence on their companies’ survivorship than the 2
nd quartile and lowest quartile 
ranked VCs. Compared against the model with VC IPO share as the VC reputation proxy, 
the higher ranked quartiles are also consistent in having positive influence on the long-
run survivorship of the VC backed companies as both tests revealed positive coefficient 
estimates. However, the first test coefficient estimate is statistically significant (within 
5% level) and second test coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant for the model 
tested with VC IPO share. The relatively lower statistical significance for using VC IPO 
share in both test estimates showed that the sensitivity of using VC IPO share in 
predicting long-run survivorship of companies is lower compared to VC market share 
when the magnitude factor of the VC reputation proxy is considered. On the test model   62
with VC firm age as reputation proxy, the higher quartile ranked VC has a negative and 
significant effect on the listing period of the IPO companies. On control variables’ effect 
on survivorship, the underwriter reputation is negative but statistically insignificant; IPO 
size, pre-IPO road show success are similar to earlier findings that the former has 
negative and significant effect on company listing time while the latter has positive and 
significant effect. Technology companies are shown to list longer but the effect is 
statistically insignificant. The effect of business cycles is mixed and statistically 
insignificant for all tests.  
  The cumulative failure percentage versus time figures also indicated the greater 
sensitivity of VC market share as reputation proxy measure when compared to VC IPO 
share. For both top versus lowest quartile and 3
rd versus 2
nd quartile tests, the cumulative 
failure curves of Figures 6(a) and 7(a) are distinct and distinguishable for VC market 
shares as VC reputation proxy model with the higher ranked quartile curve trending 
below the lower ranked quartile curve throughout the test period. The same cannot be 
said for VC IPO share as VC reputation proxy model in Figures 6(b) and 7(b) as the 
higher ranked quartile cumulative failure curve trends very closely to the lower quartile 
curve in both tests and are almost indistinguishable. In the top versus lowest quartile VC 
reputation test with VC market share, 25% of companies are expected to delist within 7.0 
and 6.0 years for the respective companies backed by top and bottom quartile VC market 
share VCs, for 50% expected delisting in 10.9 and 9.4 years respectively and, for 75% 
expected delisting in 17.0 and 14.7 years respectively. For the same test with VC IPO 
share, the 25% expected delisting are 7.0 and 6.8 years for respective companies backed 
by top and bottom quartile VC IPO share VCs, for 50% expected delisting in 10.6 and   63
10.2 years respectively, for 75% expected delisting in 15.8 and 15.2 years respectively. 
The differences of delisting time of companies backed by the top and bottom quartile 
ranked reputable VCs are larger for VC market share as VC compared to VC IPO share 
as reputation proxy, and these results are also consistent when the same comparison is 
done between 3
rd versus 2
nd quartile VC reputation test. Hence, VC market share can be 
argued to be more sensitive and effective than VC IPO share as a VC reputation proxy 
when its magnitude effect is taken in account to on the long-run survival studies of the 
VC backed company.    64
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
  The role that VCs participate in the private equity sector is a topic of considerable 
academic interest especially in the influence on their invested companies’ aftermarket 
performance. Earlier studies have empirically tested and validated the importance of VCs 
in its ability to add value to its supported companies in the after market that allowed these 
companies to perform better in terms of superior operating performance (Bharat A. Jain 
& Kini, 1995) and longer survival times (B. A. Jain & Kini, 2000). The certification 
value offered by VCs in the going public process signals the quality to the company 
through reduction in information asymmetry to the external investors (Megginson & 
Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999), hence providing a reasonable basis for external 
investors to have confidence in the future growth prospects and profitability of the newly 
listed company. However, these earlier studies treated all VCs homogeneously without 
the granularity of distinguishing the VCs by reputation levels and have mostly examined 
the association between key IPO characteristic and indicator of VC backing. This 
provided the motivation in my study to further refine the effect of VC value-add to its 
portfolio of supported companies by introducing three proposed VC reputation proxies; 
namely VC market share, VC IPO share and VC firm age and study its influence on the 
venture backed company’s long-run operating performance and survivorship in the 
aftermarket.  
  The “Keiretsu” effect of VCs having interorganizational affiliations with 
prominent exchange partners such as reputable strategic alliance partners and 
organizational equity investors can provide the start up companies backed by well   65
connected VCs a competitive edge in the pre and post going public process over the other 
companies without such backings (Stuart et al., 1999). In this study, the more reputable 
VCs in our VC reputation proxy measures are found to be positively related to more 
reputable underwriters, implying that the value-add obtained by companies backed by 
more reputable VCs does not only come from the advisory and intermediation services 
provided by the VCs, but also from the expected higher quality underwriting activities 
rendered by more reputable underwriters with close ties to the more reputable VCs. This 
can make or break a start-up company as good quality underwriters can provide better 
value-add in critical pre and post-IPO activities such as pricing, allocation, market 
making and analyst coverage (Krigman, Shaw, & Womack, 2001).  
  I find that the proposed VC reputation proxies all have positive effect on long-run 
operating performance and amongst these proxies, VC market share to be the most 
effective and strongest in its explanatory powers. As more reputable VCs usually has 
access to superior investment opportunity set and may have been able to invest in higher 
quality start-up companies at a lower price in the first place (Hsu, 2004), we also tested 
the VC reputation proxies for robustness after controlling for self selection. By including 
an additional Inverse Mills’ Ratio as explanatory variable to control for the selectivity 
bias, the VC reputation proxy effect is not trivial in explaining its association to the 
positive long term operating performance of their invested companies. We also find that 
more reputable VCs are associated with IPO issuers with greater future growth potential, 
as the more reputable VCs have positive and statistical significant effect on the long-run 
market to book ratio for all three regression models and the effect is significant even after 
accounting for self selection bias. This may be explained by the better  organizational and   66
professionalization skills provided by the more reputable VCs in their advisory services 
on their portfolio companies that allowed these companies to be able to build a more 
effective organization and management team (Thomas & Manju, 2002); which possibly 
have helped the company better and more efficiently managed their day-to-day 
operations, hence translating into superior long-run operating performances and 
survivorship. 
  I applied hazard analysis on the companies’ time to failure (delisting) as the 
dependent variable using AFT as the baseline hazard model on the three proposed VC 
reputation proxies and the critical control variables as covariates. I find that VC market 
share and VC IPO share has a consistent and positive effect on its invested companies 
listing time in the post-IPO, and VC market share have stronger explanatory powers 
compared to VC IPO share. By splitting the sample period to pre-technology bubble 
period and technology bubble period, the effect of the VC reputation proxies is negative 
and statistically insignificant on the company’s long-run survivorship in the latter period 
and this result contrasts strongly with the findings in the former period of VC reputation 
proxies (except VC firm age) having a statistically significant positive effect on the VC 
supported companies’ survivorship. Taking the cumulative failure rate of 50%, 
companies with above median VC market share backing survive 10.1 years longer when 
the company is listed during the pre-technology bubble period versus being listed during 
the technology bubble period. This highlights the excessive optimism on the part of VCs 
during the era when elevated valuations on newly listed technology companies are 
common place. This might have reduce incentives for cautious VC screening on their 
invested companies as they can take profit soon after the lock-up period is over, even   67
though severe IPO under pricings were rampant (Alexander Ljungqvist, 2003). Coupled 
with the excessive uncommitted investment capital from the VC fund raising, this might 
have resulted in reputable VCs paying high and unsustainable prices for mediocre quality 
companies (P. Gompers & Lerner, 2000) that are not able survive as long as the higher 
quality companies invested in the pre-technology bubble period.  
  Finally, by sub-dividing the sample set into quartiles according to the magnitude 
of the VC reputation proxies and crossed-compared for survival times using the hazard 
analysis, it is re-affirmed that VC market share is the more effective reputation proxy, as 
both tests for top versus lowest quartile VC reputation and 3
rd versus 2
nd quartile VC 
reputation effects on the company long-run survivorship, the above median VC market 
share coefficient estimates are positive and have greater statistical significance in its 
effect on longer post-IPO listing times for the VC invested companies.  
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Appendix A 
Definition of Variables 
IPO Long Term Performance 
Measures  Description 
ROA 
ROA is the industry-adjusted rate of return on assets, defined as Net Income (NIQ) 
divided by Total Assets (ATQ) minus industry median ROA, and taking average 
for first three years following the IPO. Each IPO issuer is matched to their 
respective sample of companies based on the 4 digit SIC code, by deducting the 
sample companies’ median ROA off IPO issuing company’s ROA to account for 
the industry effects.  If the IPO issuing company do not survive beyond 3 years, the 
maximum number of quarters data available in is taken and matched against the 
industry median ROA for the same number of quarters to account in the attempt to 
minimize survivorship bias. The data, NIQ and ATQ, are taken off the Compustat 
Quarterly Database 
 
ROE 
ROE is the industry-adjusted rate of return on outstanding equity, defined as Net 
Income (NIQ) divided by the Total Common Shares Outstanding (CSHOQ) minus 
the industry median ROE, and taking average for the first three years following the 
IPO.  Each IPO issuer is matched to their respective sample of companies based on 
the 4 digit SIC code, by deducting the sample companies’ median ROE off IPO 
issuing company’s ROE to account for the industry effects. If the IPO issuing 
company do not survive beyond 3 years, the maximum number of quarters data 
available in is taken and matched against the industry median ROE for the same 
number of quarters to account in the attempt to minimize survivorship bias.The 
data, NIQ and CSHOQ, are taken off Compustat Quarterly Database 
 
Market-to-Book 
Market-to-book value is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity to 
book value of equity. The market value of equity is defined as number of shares 
outstanding (CSHOQ) multiplied by its closing stock price for prior quarter 
(PRCCQ). The book value of equity is defined as total common/ordinary equity 
(CEQQ) plus net deferred balance sheet income taxes (TXDBQ), minus carrying 
value of preferred stock (Data 55).Each IPO issuer is matched to their respective 
sample of companies based on the 4 digit SIC code, by deducting the sample 
companies’ median Market-to-Book off IPO issuing company’s Market-to-Book to 
account for the industry effects. If the IPO issuing company do not survive beyond 
3 years, the maximum number of quarters data available in is taken and matched 
against the industry median Market-to-Book for the same number of quarters to 
account in the attempt to minimize survivorship bias. . Data CSHOQ, PRCCQ, 
CEQQ, TXDBQ and carrying value of preferred stock (Data 55) [ in database of 
the old data format] are also taken off Compustat Quarterly Database 
 
VC Reputation Proxy  Description 
VC Market Share 
The market share of a VC is based on the dollar value of IPO deals that the VC 
backed in the 3 calendar years immediately preceding each IPO, as a proportion of 
the dollar value of all VC-backed IPOs in the same period. Each VC associated 
with an IPO is given full credit for the gross issue size of the IPO. For example, for 
IPOs made in 1999, it is the dollar market share of the IPO market for a VC in the 
years 1996-1998. Data is taken off Security Data Corporation Global New Issues 
Database. 
 
VC IPO Share 
The share of VC-backed IPOs is defined as the number of IPO deals that the VC 
backed in the 3 calendar years immediately preceding each IPO, as a proportion of 
all VC-backed IPOs in the same period. Data is taken off Security Data 
Corporation (SDC) Global New Issue Database. 
 
VC Age 
The age of the VC computed from the date of its incorporation to the IPO date. 
Data is taken off SDC Global New Issue Database and completed via internet 
search when data is not readily available.  
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Control Variables  Description 
Underwriter 
The lead underwriter reputation score as quantified by the Carter-Manaster scale, 
modified by Ritter and made available on his web site:  
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.xls 
 
Age 
The natural log of the age (in years) of the issuer at the time of the computed from 
the date of incorporation to the date of the offering. Data is taken off SDC Global 
New Issue Database and completed via internet search when data is not readily 
available. 
 
Assets Before IPO 
The natural log of the IPO issuer’s total assets at the end of the quarter immediately 
prior to the IPO date. 
 
Size 
The natural log of the IPO gross proceeds from the offering. Data is taken off SDC 
Global New Issue Database. 
 
Tech 
A binary indicator to indicate that the issuing IPO is from a technology intensive 
industry: marked as 1 for technology based companies and 0 otherwise based on 
SDC database assignments. 
 
Roadshow 
A tercile indicator takes on the value of 1, 2 or 3 depending on whether the offer 
price is below, within or above the initial filing range respectively. Data is taken off 
SDC Global New Issue Database. 
 
Bcycle 
A binary indicator to indicate if the IPO is issued during a business contraction or 
expansion cycle as determined by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
on NBER’s website: http://wwwdev.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.The indicator 
is 0 for IPOs issued during the former period and 1 for IPOs issued the latter 
period.    74 
Appendix B 
Technology Intensive Businesses Based on Security Data Corporation’s Classification 
(‘Y’ in columns means that the NAICS defined major industry contains the SDC classified high technology business) 
 
   NAICS Major  Industries/ SIC  Codes                                                                   
   Agriculture 
Electric  
Service Healthcare Leisure  Manufacturing 
Mortgage 
Bank 
Other  
Services 
Pers/Bus/
Rep Svc 
Radio/TV/
Telecom 
Real 
Estate Retail Wholesale 
High Tech Industry (SDC 
Classfication)  18  49  80  78  27 28 30 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39  61  82  73  87  48  65  52 57 59 50  51 
Advanced Manufacturing                              Y                                        
Alarm Systems                             Y                                        
All Biotechnology Research                                               Y                     
All General Technology                             Y                                        
Applications Software              Y            Y  Y    Y           Y  Y           Y     Y    
Artificial Organs/Limbs                                 Y                                    
Biological/Chemical Pro                 Y                                                    
Biotech Instruments/Equ        Y        Y          Y      Y                                    
Blood Derivatives                 Y                                                    
CAD/CAM/CAE/Graphics 
System                           Y  Y               Y                        
CD Rom Drives                           Y                                          
Cellular Communications & 
Network Systems                             Y               Y     Y                  
Computer Consulting 
Services                                         Y  Y                   Y    
Data Communications                           Y  Y               Y     Y                  
Data Processing Service        Y                  Y              Y  Y  Y                     
Database 
Software/Programmes                                            Y                        
Disk Drives                           Y  Y               Y                        
Drug Delivery System                 Y                Y                                    
Drugs/Pharmaceuticals                 Y                                                    
General Med. Instrument                 Y                Y                                    
General Pharmaceuticals                 Y                Y              Y             Y     Y 
Genetically Eng. Prod  Y     Y        Y                                                    
Healthcare Services        Y                        Y                                  Y 
Internet Services & Software     Y     Y  Y            Y  Y         Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y     Y 
In-Vitro Diagnostic Process                 Y                Y              Y                     
Lab Equipment                                 Y                                    
Lasers(Excluding Medical)                           Y  Y                                        
Mainframes & Super 
Computers                           Y  Y                                        
Medical Imaging Systems                                 Y                                    
Medical Lasers                                 Y                                    
Medical Monitoring Systems        Y                        Y                                      75 
Medicinal Chemicals                 Y                                                    
Messaging Systems                             Y                     Y                  
Microcomputers                           Y      Y                                    
Microwave Communication                             Y                     Y                  
Modems                             Y               Y                        
Monitors/Terminals                           Y  Y                                        
Networking Systems (LAN)                           Y  Y    Y           Y     Y                  
Nuclear Medicines                 Y                                                    
Nuclear                                 Y                                    
Operating Systems                                            Y                        
Other Biotechnology        Y        Y                Y              Y                     
Other Computer Systems                           Y  Y      Y        Y                        
Other Electronics                   Y  Y      Y  Y               Y                        
Other Peripherals                           Y  Y    Y           Y                        
Other Software                           Y  Y            Y  Y                        
Over-The-Counter Drugs                 Y                                                    
Portable Computers                           Y                                          
Precision/Measuring  
Equipment & Testing        Y                  Y    Y  Y                                    
Printed Circuit Boards                           Y  Y                                        
Printers                           Y                                          
Process Control Systems                           Y  Y    Y           Y                        
Programming Services                           Y              Y  Y                        
Rehabilitation Equipment                 Y                Y                                    
Research & Development         Y        Y                Y              Y                     
Robotics                         Y  Y  Y                                        
Satellite Communication                             Y               Y     Y                  
Search,Detection,Navigation                               Y  Y                                    
Semiconductors                           Y  Y    Y           Y                        
Software                           Y                 Y                        
Superconductors                             Y                                        
Surgical Instruments        Y        Y                Y                                    
Telecommunications 
Equipment                       Y    Y  Y               Y     Y                  
Telephone Interconnect                              Y               Y     Y                  
Turnkey Systems 
Communications                                            Y                        
Utilities/File Mgmt Software                                            Y                   Y    
Vaccines/Specialty Drug                 Y                                                    
Workstations                                Y                                                76
Table 1 
Industrial Composition of Venture-backed IPOs with High Tech and Non High Tech Split 
 
Table 1 provides the industrial composition of venture-backed IPOs with High Tech and Non High Tech Splits 
for our IPO sample set from 1985 to 2007, extracted from Security Data Corporation (SDC) Global New 
Issues database. It has a viable set of 1876 IPOs brought to public over this period and the major industries are 
defined using the NAICS classification. 
 
SIC 
Code 
SIC Major Group  High 
Tech 
(%) Non 
High Tech 
(%) Grand   
Total 
(%) 
13  Oil & Gas Extraction                 -               -    11  3.1%  11  0.6% 
15  Building Construction General Contractors  
& Operative Builders  
               -               -    3  0.8%  3  0.2% 
17  Construction Special Trade Contractors                 -               -    4  1.1%  4  0.2% 
20  Food & Kindred Products                 -               -    9  2.5%  9  0.5% 
22  Textile Mill Products                 -               -    4  1.1%  4  0.2% 
23  Apparel & Other Finished Products Made  
From Fabrics & Similar Materials 
               -               -    5  1.4%  5  0.3% 
24  Lumber & Wood Products, Except Furniture                 -               -    1  0.3%  1  0.1% 
25  Furniture & Fixtures                 -               -    1  0.3%  1  0.1% 
26  Paper & Allied Products                 -               -    4  1.1%  4  0.2% 
27  Printing, Publishing, & Allied Industries  3  0.2%  4  1.1%  7  0.4% 
28  Chemicals & Allied Products  253  16.7%  8  2.2%  261  13.9% 
30  Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products  1  0.1%  1  0.3%  2  0.1% 
31  Leather & Leather Products                 -               -    2  0.6%  2  0.1% 
32  Stone, Clay, Glass, & Concrete Products  1  0.1%  3  0.8%  4  0.2% 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  1  0.1%  4  1.1%  5  0.3% 
35  Industrial & Commercial Machinery  
& Computer Equipment 
92  6.1%  10  2.8%  102  5.4% 
36  Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment  
& Components, Except Computer Equipment 
208  13.7%  9  2.5%  217  11.6% 
37 Transportation  Equipment  1  0.1%  5  1.4%  6  0.3% 
38  Measuring, Analyzing, & Controlling Instruments;  
Photographic,Medical & Optical Goods;  
Watches & Clocks 
177  11.7%  10  2.8%  187  10.0% 
39  Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  1  0.1%  2  0.6%  3  0.2% 
40  Railroad Transportation                 -               -    1  0.3%  1  0.1% 
41  Local & Suburban Transit & Interurban  
Highway Passenger Transportation 
               -               -    1  0.3%  1  0.1% 
42  Motor Freight Transportation & Warehousing                 -               -    3  0.8%  3  0.2% 
44  Water Transportation                 -               -    1  0.3%  1  0.1% 
45  Transportation By Air                 -               -    2  0.6%  2  0.1% 
47  Transportation Services                 -               -    4  1.1%  4  0.2% 
48 Communications  66  4.3%  22  6.1%  88  4.7% 
49  Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services  1  0.1%  12  3.4%  13  0.7% 
50  Wholesale Trade-durable Goods  4  0.3%  17  4.7%  21  1.1% 
51  Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods  3  0.2%  7  2.0%  10  0.5% 
52  Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply,  
& Mobile Home Dealers 
1  0.1%  1  0.3%  2  0.1% 
53  General Merch&ise Stores                 -               -    7  2.0%  7  0.4% 
54  Food Stores                 -               -    4  1.1%  4  0.2% 
55  Automotive Dealers & Gasoline Service Stations                 -               -    5  1.4%  5  0.3% 
56  Apparel & Accessory Stores                 -               -    8  2.2%  8  0.4% 
57  Home Furniture, Furnishings, & Equipment Stores  7  0.5%  6  1.7%  13  0.7% 
58  Eating & Drinking Places                 -               -    16  4.5%  16  0.9% 
59 Miscellaneous  Retail  16  1.1%  28  7.8%  44  2.3% 
60  Depository Institutions                 -               -    1  0.3%  1  0.1% 
61  Non-depository Credit Institutions  1  0.1%  4  1.1%  5  0.3% 
65 Real  Estate  2  0.1%  1  0.3%  3  0.2% 
72  Personal Services                 -               -    2  0.6%  2  0.1% 
73 Business  Services  590  38.9%  40  11.2%  630  33.6% 
75  Automotive Repair, Services, & Parking                 -               -    4  1.1%  4  0.2% 
78 Motion  Pictures  3  0.2%  4  1.1%  7  0.4% 
79  Amusement & Recreation Services                 -               -    2  0.6%  2  0.1% 
80 Health  Services  37  2.4%  28  7.8%  65  3.5%   77
SIC 
Code 
SIC Major Group  High 
Tech 
(%) Non 
High Tech 
(%) Grand   
Total 
(%) 
82 Educational  Services  6  0.4%  7  2.0%  13  0.7% 
83  Social Services                 -               -    5  1.4%  5  0.3% 
87  Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management,  
& Related Services 
43  2.8%  14  3.9%  57  3.0% 
95  Administration Of Environmental Quality  
& Housing Programs 
               -               -    1  0.3%  1  0.1% 
Grand Total 1518  100.0%  358  100.0%  1876  100.0% Table 2 
Distribution of Venture Backed High Tech and Non High Tech Firms That Failed Y Years After IPO Issuance 
 
Table 2 illustrates the distribution of the delisted venture backed IPOs for high tech and non high tech firms in a cross sectional view for the IPO issue year versus period (number of years, Y) after the 
IPO is launched. A grand total of 768 IPO delistings (for negative reasons) was documented for study period, which constitutes 40.4% of the total venture backed IPOs in sample study (1876 IPOs). 
Distribution of Venture Backed High Tech and Non High Tech Firms that Failed Y Years after IPO                                              
IPO 
Year 
Hi Tech/ 
Non Hi 
Tech 
Gran
d  
Total 
Y = 
1  (%) 
Y = 
2  (%) 
Y = 
3  (%) 
Y = 
4  (%) 
Y = 
5  (%) 
Y = 
6  (%) 
Y = 
7  (%) 
 Y = 
8   (%) 
 Y = 
9   (%) 
 Y = 
10   (%) 
 Y = 
11   (%) 
 Y = 
12   (%) 
 Y = 
13   (%) 
 Y > 
13  (%) 
1985 Hi  Tech  6      -    
         
-     1  1.0%      -    
         
-     1  1.2%     -   
        
-         -   
         
-         -   
        
-         -   
         
-          1   2.6% 
        
1   3.6%       -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-     2     4.6% 
  
Not Hi 
Tech  7      -    
         
-         -    
         
-         -    
         
-        -   
        
-     4  4.8%      -   
        
-         -   
        
-         -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-            3   6.8% 
1986 Hi  Tech  16      -    
         
-     1  1.0%  1  1.0%     -   
        
-     1  1.2%  1  1.7% 
   
2   3.4% 
   
1   2.9%       2   5.3%        -    
        
-           2   8.7%         1   4.2%       -    
        
-            4   9.1% 
  
Not Hi 
Tech  12      -    
         
-     3  3.1%      -    
         
-        -   
        
-     3  3.6%  1  1.7% 
   
1   1.7%      -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-            4  9.1% 
1987 Hi  Tech  22  4  5.5%  1  1.0%      -    
         
-     1  1.2%     -   
        
-         -   
        
-    
   
2   3.4% 
   
1   2.9%       1   2.6% 
        
1   3.6%        1   4.3%         2   8.3%        2  
15.4
%         6 
13.6
% 
  
Not Hi 
Tech  9      -    
         
-         -    
         
-         -    
         
-        -   
        
-        -   
        
-     1  1.7%      -   
        
-         -   
         
-          2   5.3% 
        
1   3.6%        2   8.7%         1   4.2%       -    
        
-     2    4.6%    
1988 Hi  Tech  9      -    
         
-         -    
         
-     2  2.0%     -   
        
-        -   
        
-         -   
        
-         -   
        
-    
   
2   5.9%      -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-            1   4.2%        2  
15.4
%   2      4.6%    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  3  1  1.4%      -    
         
-     1  1.0%     -   
        
-        -   
        
-         -   
        
-    
   
1   1.7%      -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
         
-          -    
         
-    
1989 Hi  Tech  6      -    
         
-         -    
         
-     1  1.0%     -   
        
-     1  1.2%      -   
        
-         -   
        
-         -   
         
-          1   2.6%        -    
        
-          -    
         
-           -    
        
-           1   7.7%  2    4.6%     
  
Not Hi 
Tech  7  2  2.7%      -    
         
-         -    
         
-     1  1.2%     -   
        
-     1  1.7% 
   
2   3.4%      -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-            1   4.2%       -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
1990 Hi  Tech  8      -    
         
-         -    
         
-     1  1.0%     -   
        
-     1  1.2%      -   
        
-    
   
1   1.7%      -   
         
-         -   
        
-    
        
2   7.1%        1   4.3%         1   4.2%        1   7.7%       -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  7      -    
         
-     1  1.0%      -    
         
-        -   
        
-        -   
        
-     1  1.7% 
   
1   1.7% 
   
1   2.9%      -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-            3   6.8% 
1991 Hi  Tech  43      -    
         
-         -    
         
-     5  5.0%  4  4.9%  6  7.2%  4  6.8% 
   
8  
13.6
% 
   
3   8.8%       3   7.9% 
        
2   7.1%        2   8.7%         1   4.2%        1   7.7%         4   9.1% 
  
Not Hi 
Tech  12  3  4.1%  1  1.0%  1  1.0%  1  1.2%  1  1.2%      -   
        
-    
   
2   3.4% 
   
1   2.9%      -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-            1   4.2%       -    
        
-            1   2.3% 
1992 Hi  Tech  45      -    
         
-     3  3.1%  8  8.0%  2  2.4%  5  6.0%  4  6.8% 
   
1   1.7% 
   
4  
11.8
%       8  
21.1
% 
        
1   3.6%       -    
        
-            3  
12.5
%        1   7.7%         5  
11.4
% 
  
Not Hi 
Tech  21      -    
         
-     1  1.0%  5  5.0%  1  1.2%  2  2.4%      -   
        
-    
   
2   3.4% 
   
2   5.9%       2   5.3%        -    
        
-           2   8.7%         1   4.2%       -    
        
-      3     6.8%    
1993 Hi  Tech  55  3  4.1%  4  4.1%  2  2.0%  5  6.1%  6  7.2%  11 
18.6
% 
   
4   6.8% 
   
4  
11.8
%       1   2.6% 
        
7  
25.0
%        1   4.3%         4  
16.7
%        1   7.7%    2     4.6%    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  19  1  1.4%  2  2.0%  1  1.0%  4  4.9%  1  1.2%  3  5.1% 
   
3   5.1% 
   
2   5.9%      -   
        
-    
        
1   3.6%       -    
        
-            1   4.2%       -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
1994 Hi  Tech  52  1  1.4%  7  7.1%  4  4.0%  7  8.5%  12 
14.5
%  3  5.1% 
   
6  
10.2
% 
   
2   5.9%       1   2.6% 
        
3  
10.7
%        1   4.3%         1   4.2%        3  
23.1
%         1   2.3% 
  
Not Hi 
Tech  13      -    
         
-     1  1.0%  2  2.0%  3  3.7%  3  3.6%      -   
        
-    
   
1   1.7%      -   
         
-          1   2.6%        -    
        
-           2   8.7%        -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
1995 Hi  Tech  79  5  6.8%  15 
15.3
%  9  9.0%  15 
18.3
%  7  8.4%  6 
10.2
% 
   
7  
11.9
% 
   
1   2.9%       6  
15.8
% 
        
4  
14.3
%        1   4.3%         2   8.3%        1   7.7%       -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  15      -    
         
-         -    
         
-     4  4.0%     -   
        
-     2  2.4%  1  1.7% 
   
2   3.4% 
   
1   2.9%       2   5.3%        -    
        
-          -    
        
-            3  
12.5
%       -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
1996 Hi  Tech  32  3  4.1%  4  4.1%  6  6.0%  6  7.3%  2  2.4%  2  3.4% 
   
1   1.7% 
   
1   2.9%       2   5.3% 
        
2   7.1%        3  
13.0
%        -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  33  3  4.1%  4  4.1%  10 
10.0
%  5  6.1%     -   
        
-     3  5.1% 
   
1   1.7% 
   
5  
14.7
%       1   2.6%        -    
        
-           1   4.3%        -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
1997 Hi  Tech  22  1  1.4%  2  2.0%  3  3.0%  5  6.1%  3  3.6%      -   
        
-         -   
        
-    
   
1   2.9%       1   2.6% 
        
2   7.1%        4  
17.4
%        -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  20  3  4.1%  5  5.1%  3  3.0%  2  2.4%  5  6.0%  1  1.7%      -   
        
-         -   
         
-         -   
        
-    
        
1   3.6%       -    
         
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
1998 Hi  Tech  7  4  5.5%  1  1.0%      -    
         
-        -   
        
-        -   
        
-         -   
        
-    
   
1   1.7% 
   
1   2.9%      -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  12  1  1.4%  1  1.0%  1  1.0%  1  1.2%  1  1.2%  2  3.4% 
   
1   1.7% 
   
1   2.9%       3   7.9%        -    
        
-          -    
         
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
1999 Hi  Tech  60  13 
17.8
%  18 
18.4
%  6  6.0%  6  7.3%  8  9.6%  4  6.8% 
   
5   8.5%      -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  10  3  4.1%  1  1.0%  2  2.0%  2  2.4%     -   
        
-     1  1.7% 
   
1   1.7%      -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
2000 Hi  Tech  62  16 
21.9
%  11 
11.2
%  14 
14.0
%  5  6.1%  7  8.4%  6 
10.2
% 
   
3   5.1%      -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-      79 
  
Not Hi 
Tech  5  2  2.7%  1  1.0%      -    
         
-     1  1.2%     -   
        
-     1  1.7%      -   
        
-         -   
         
-       
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
         
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
2001 Hi  Tech  4      -    
         
-     3  3.1%      -    
         
-     1  1.2%     -   
        
-         -   
        
-         -   
        
-         -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech  2      -    
         
-         -    
         
-         -    
         
-     1  1.2%     -   
        
-     1  1.7%      -   
        
-         -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
>200
2  Hi Tech  16  3  4.1%  4  4.1%  6  6.0%     -   
        
-     2  2.4%  1  1.7%      -   
        
-         -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
  
Not Hi 
Tech 
        
7   1  1.4%  2  2.0%  2  2.0%  2  2.4%     -   
        
-         -   
        
-         -   
        
-         -   
         
-         -   
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-           -    
        
-          -    
        
-          -    
         
-    
Grand Total  758  73 
100.0
%  98 
100.0
%  100 
100.0
%  82 
100.0
%  83 
100.0
%  59 
100.0
%  59 
100.0
% 
   
34  
100.0
%     38  
100.0
% 
      
28  
100.0
%      23  
100.0
%       24  
100.0
%      13  
100.0
%  44  
100.0
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Table 3 
Selective Descriptive Statistics for Listed versus Delisted Venture Backed IPOs 
 
Table 3 presents selected descriptive statistics for the selected VC reputation proxy measures (VC Age, VC 
Market Share and VC IPO Share) and control variables which characterizes the IPO companies (Asset size, 
company age, number of years traded, underwriter reputation, IPO road show success and technology 
indicator), compiled for both still in trading and delisted venture backed IPO issues. A two-sample t-test 
assuming unequal variances are tested for the difference in means of the reputation proxies as well as 
control variable measures between these two categories of IPO issues 
 
                 *,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively 
 
  
IPOs Still Trading 
(N=1118) 
IPOs Delisted 
( N=758)  Mean 
        
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Difference  t-stat  Unit of Variable 
VC Reputation: 
VC Age  16.971 6.629  15.700  7.513  1.271  3.726  *** 
Years 
VC Reputation: 
VC Market Share  2.620% 0.021%  2.650%  0.019% -0.030%  -0.303  
Percentage 
VC Reputation: 
VC IPO Share  8.850% 0.192% 10.220% 0.209% -1.370%  -1.445 * 
Percentage 
IPO Size  56.880  71.847  46.903  59.115  9.977    3.281  ***  USD Millions 
Asset Size Before Offering  77.720  298.855  68.012  223.470  9.709    0.718    USD Millions 
Company Age at Listing  8.315  7.422  8.400  8.648  -0.085    -0.150    Years 
Years Traded  9.867  5.190  5.794  4.060  4.073    19.011  ***  Years 
Underwriter Reputation  8.168  1.364  7.943  1.498  0.225    3.299  *** 
Carter-Manaster  
9-point scale 
High Technology Firm  0.254  0.436  0.262  0.440  -0.007    -0.354    Binary 
Road Show Success  2.095  0.772  2.092  0.731  0.002    0.069    
1- Below Filing 
Range  
2- Within Filing 
Range, 
3 - Above Filing 
Range   81
Table 4 
Impact of VC Presence in IPOs ( Jan 1985 – Dec 2007) 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the parameter estimates and associated p-values from ordinary least squares 
estimation based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent from 
Newey-West adjustments. The general regression model: 
 
ε β
β β β β β
+
+ + + + + = − −
Tech
Age Size r Underwrite VC Book to Market ROE ROA o
5
4 3 2 1 / /
 
 
Where the dependent variable ROA , ROE or Market-to-Book ratio is regressed against VC, a binary 
indicator signaling VC involvement (VC equals 1 indicates IPO with VC backing and equals 0 otherwise) 
in the IPO and other control variables (Underwriter, Size, Age and Tech) as listed in Appendix A. The 
regressions are estimated for a total of 4012 VC backed (1876 IPOs) and non VC backed IPOs (2136 IPOs) 
completed in the period 1985-2007.  
 
   VC UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE TECH  Adjusted R
2   
Model 1  0.546***  0.288**  0.005*** -0.394** 0.473***  5.25%   
ROA  (0.000)  (0.051)  (0.003) (0.040) (0.010)     
             
Model 2  0.280**  0.410*  0.042** -0.469 0.156**  4.74%   
ROE  (0.037)  (0.070)  (0.031) (0.183) (0.021)     
             
Model 3  1.254** 0.388**  -0.031**  0.077*  2.330***  3.40%   
Market-to-
Book 
(0.024)  (0.017)  (0.019) (0.058) (0.010)    
 
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively p-values in parentheses 
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Table 5 
Cross sectional Regression of VC Reputation Proxies on Control Variables 
 
Table 5 presents coefficient estimates and in parentheses, the associated p-values on heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors adjusted for industry clustering where the dependent variable measuring 
alternative VC reputation measures (VC age, VC Market Share and VC IPO Share), VC_Reputation, is 
regressed on IPO issue variables listed below. The equation below estimated with censored logistic 
regression: 
 
ε β
β β β β β
+
+ + + + + =
Tech
Age Size reIPO AssetsBefo r Underwrite putation VC o
5
4 3 2 1 Re _
 
 
All the issuer characteristics as regressants (Underwriter, Assets Before IPO, Size, Age and Tech) are 
defined in Appendix A. The regressions are estimated over 1876 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 1985-
2007 period.  
 
  UNDERWRITER  ASSETS BEFORE 
IPO  SIZE AGE TECH Adjusted  R
2 
Model 1  0.149** -0.493***  -0.917***  -0.621  0.612***  18.23% 
VC Age  (0.018) (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.132)  (0.009)   
            
Model 2  0.050* -0.084***  -0.050  -0.054*  0.134***  23.73% 
VC Market 
Share 
(0.064) (0.010)  (0.020)  (0.071)  (0.006)   
            
Model 3  0.023** -0.002*  -0.022*  -0.005*  0.095***  27.84% 
VC IPO 
Share 
(0.014) (0.072)  (0.088)  (0.069)  (0.001)    
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parentheses 
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Table 6A 
Pair-wise Pearson’s Correlation between VC Reputation and Control Variables 
 
Table 6A shows the pair-wise Pearson’s correlation between alternative VC reputation measures and the 
IPO issuer characteristics. They are estimated over 1876 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 1985-2007 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
   VC Market Share  VC IPO Share  VC Firm Age 
Underwriter    0.149 0.126 0.055 
Size  0.203 0.081 0.162 
Age -0.079  0.131  0.034 
Technology  -0.016 -0.056 -0.026 
Roadshow   0.141  -0.011  0.053   84
ε β β β β
β β β
+ + + + +
+ + = − −
Tech Age Size r Underwrite
Roadshow putation VC Book to Market ROE ROA o
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Table 6B 
Cross sectional Regression of VC Reputation Proxies on Long-run Operating Performance 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates and in parentheses associated p-values based on standard errors 
which are robust to heteroskedasticity and industry clustering. The post-IPO long-run match-adjusted ROA, 
ROE and Market-to-Book ratio, purged of any survivorship bias, is regressed on one of the alternative VC 
reputation measures, VC_Reputation, using the following OLS regression specification: 
 
 
 
 
And the results are presented in panel A, B and C for the respective dependent variable of ROA, ROE and 
Market-to-Book ratio. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, VC IPO Share and VC Age) and the 
control variables as regressants (Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech and Roadshow) are defined in Appendix A. 
The regressions are estimated over 1876 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 1985-2007 period.  
 
 
Panel A: ROA             
   VC Rep  UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH  ROADSHOW 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Model 1  0.209** 0.040***  -0.395*  0.301**  -0.743  0.152*  5.27% 
VC Market 
Share 
(0.017) (0.005)  (0.069) (0.012)  (0.540) (0.088)   
            
Model 2  0.348** 0.186*  -0.289** 0.311  0.587* -0.136  4.09% 
VC IPO 
Share 
(0.041) (0.098)  (0.046) (0.201)  (0.054) (0.168)   
            
Model 3  0.120 0.367***  -0.364*  -0.207**  0.409  -0.450  3.41% 
VC Age  (0.129) (0.010)  (0.077) (0.045)  (0.155) (0.113)    
              
Panel B:  ROE             
   VC Rep  UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH  ROADSHOW 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Model 1  0.554*** 0.440*  -0.246*  -0.101  1.054  0.095*  4.68% 
VC Market 
Share 
(0.008) (0.052)  (0.096) (0.622)  (0.175) (0.056)   
            
Model 2  0.215** 0.107  -0.251* -0.356  0.101*  -0.670*  3.96% 
VC IPO 
Share 
(0.046) (0.264)  (0.081) (0.712)  (0.083) (0.064)   
            
Model 3  0.207* 0.108  -0.300*  -0.363  0.932 -0.157  3.29% 
VC Age  (0.061) (0.352)  (0.093) (0.144)  (0.193) (0.433)    
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parentheses   85
 
Panel C: Market-to-Book           
   VC 
Rep UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH ROADSHOW 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Model 1  1.329* 0.693*  -0.765***  0.252**  1.738* 0.016  4.89% 
VC Market 
Share 
(0.088) (0.056)  (0.002) (0.048)  (0.090)  (0.380)   
            
Model 2  0.733** 0.726**  -0.356*  -0.494  0.237** 0.081  3.57% 
VC IPO 
Share 
(0.042) (0.044)  (0.063) (0.318)  (0.030)  (0.549)   
            
Model 3  0.104* 0.780**  -0.859* -0.588  1.230** 0.032  4.07% 
VC Age  (0.056) (0.013)  (0.090) (0.728)  (0.029)  (0.220)    
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in 
parentheses   86
Table 7A 
Correction for Self Selection Bias - Stage 1 Cross sectional Regression to Obtain Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
 
This table presents the first stage of the two-stage-Heckman regression coefficients and in parentheses its 
associated p-values. In this first stage, a logit regression is estimated for the likelihood of having a highly 
ranked VC, based on VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, VC IPO Share and VC Age) of VC backed 
deals above the median. The associated p-values are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity 
and industry clustering. The first stage regression equation is: 
 
ε β β β β β + + + + + = Tech Age Size r Underwrite p VC o 4 3 2 1 * Re _  
 
Where VC_Rep* is a binary variable that equals 1 if VC reputation proxy measurement  > median VC 
reputation proxy measurement and 0 otherwise. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, VC IPO 
Share and VC Age) and the control variables as regressants (Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech and Roadshow) 
are defined in Appendix A. The regressions are estimated over 1876 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 
1985-2007 period. 
 
   ASSET SIZE  AGE  TECH  INTERCEPT  Adjusted R
2 
Model 1  -0.051** 0.402 -0.376*  0.156**  -0.851**  6.80% 
VC Market Share* 
(0.022) (0.135)  (0.080)  (0.035)  (0.031)   
            
Model 2  -0.040* 0.508  -0.430*  0.096*  -1.818***  6.22% 
VC IPO Share*  (0.062) (0.117)  (0.069)  (0.057)  (0.001)   
            
Model 3  -0.044* 0.679** -0.137  0.048*  -1.431***  5.56% 
VC Age*  (0.059) (0.015)  (0.173)  (0.087)  (0.002)    
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in 
parentheses   87
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Table 7B 
Correction for Selection Bias - Stage 2 Cross sectional Regression of Long-run Operating Performances 
on VC Reputation (Inclusive of Inverse Mills Ratio) 
 
This table presents the second stage of the two-stage-Heckman regression coefficients and in parentheses 
its associated p-values  based on standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity and industry 
clustering. The Inverse Mills’ Ratio estimated from the first stage regression is used as an additional 
independent variable to the following second stage OLS regression specification: 
 
 
 
 
 
And the results are presented in panel A, B and C for the respective dependent variable of ROA, ROE and 
Market-to-Book ratio. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, VC IPO Share and VC Age) and the 
control variables as regressants (Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech and Roadshow) are defined in Appendix A. 
The regressions are estimated over 1876 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 1985-2007 period.  
  
Panel A:  ROA             
   VC  
Rep  UNDERWRITER SIZE  AGE TECH  ROADSHOW 
INVERS
E MILLS  
RATIO 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Model 1  0.388** 0.165**  -0.427  0.584*  -0.300  0.447**  -0.103*  5.99% 
VC 
Market 
Share 
(0.041) (0.014)  (0.245)  (0.074)  (0.364)  (0.031)  (0.100)   
                
Model 2  0.218* 0.358* -0.537**  0.443  0.384  -0.662  -0.108**  4.59% 
VC IPO 
Share 
(0.074) (0.082)  (0.038)  (0.479)  (0.164)  (0.324)  (0.043)   
                
Model 3  0.09 0.307*  -0.203*  0.451**  0.629  -0.164*  -0.215**  3.80% 
VC Age  (0.121) (0.080)  (0.060)  (0.032)  (0.147)  (0.099)  (0.037)   
              
Panel B: ROE             
   VC 
Rep  UNDERWRITER SIZE  AGE TECH  ROADSHOW 
INVERS
E MILLS  
RATIO 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Model 1  0.395** 0.246* -0.771**  -0.991  0.590*  0.138  -1.094***  9.66% 
VC 
Market 
Share 
(0.033) (0.067)  (0.049)  (0.498)  (0.095)  (0.139)  (0.000)   
                
Model 2  0.292** 0.245  -0.274*  -0.706  0.140*  0.140  -1.020*  8.79% 
VC IPO 
Share 
(0.012) (0.136)  (0.061)  (0.220)  (0.069)  (0.102)  (0.065)   
                
Model 3  0.022* 0.156** -0.415*  -0.811*  0.236  -0.419  -0.530***  6.61% 
VC Age  (0.055) (0.049)  (0.069)  (0.083)  (0.111)  (0.346)  (0.008)   
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in 
parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
   88
 
Panel C: Market-to-Book             
   VC  
Rep  UNDERWRITER SIZE  AGE TECH  ROADSHOW 
INVERS
E MILLS  
RATIO 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Model 1  0.264** 0.900**  -1.445*  0.591  1.168  0.127*  -2.591*  5.75% 
VC 
Market 
Share 
(0.023) (0.012)  (0.060)  (0.562)  (0.133)  (0.062)  (0.095)   
                
Model 2  0.405* 1.011*** -0.559**  -0.683  0.216**  0.333*  -1.386*  4.98% 
VC IPO 
Share 
(0.081) (0.010)  (0.046)  (0.387)  (0.050)  (0.059)  (0.097)   
                
Model 3  0.069* 0.971 -1.017*  -0.347  0.997**  0.279**  -1.256*  4.82% 
VC Age  (0.098) (0.197)  (0.082)  (0.495)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.083)   
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in 
parentheses 
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Table 8 
Survivorship Test for Above Median Reputation VC (VC Rep =1) versus Below Median Reputation VC (VC Rep =0) - 1985 -2007 
 
Table 8 presents the accelerated failure time model (AFT) regression coefficients and in parentheses its associated p-values based on maximum likelihood 
estimation method using Newton-Raphson algorithm for convergence and the individual coefficient estimates tested using a χ
2-statistic. The simplified linear 
representation of the regression specification:  
Where Ln(Ht) is natural logarithm of the time to delisting of the individual companies in years,
) ) ( 1 (
) ( ) (
1
0 ρ
ρ
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λ λρ
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t t H
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−
,
β λ
X e = ,  σ ρ / 1 =  and t is 
the individual sample time to failure in years. The VC_Reputation is a binary variable that equals 1 if VC reputation proxy measurement > median VC reputation 
proxy measurement and 0 otherwise. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, VC IPO Share and VC Age) and the control variables as regressants 
(Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech, Roadshow and Bcycle) are defined in Appendix A. The regressions are estimated over 1431 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 
1985-2007 period. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
VC Rep  UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH ROADSHOW  BCYCLE  INTERCEPT 
Ancillary 
Scale, σ 
Log Likelihood 
Model 1  0.1458*** 0.0163 -0.0055***  0.0042*  0.0585  0.1053***  -0.0535  2.4943***  0.3577 -1071.87 
VC Market Share  (0.000) (0.204) (0.000)  (0.075)  (0.122)  (0.000)  (0.615)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 2  0.0552* 0.0074  -0.0056***  0.0055**  0.0575  0.1152***  -0.0519  2.4534***  0.3598 -1060.47 
VC IPO Share  (0.100) (0.560) (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.131)  (0.000)  (0.631)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 3  -0.3814*** -0.0011 -0.0048***  0.0046**  0.0538  0.1189***  -0.0341  2.5482***  0.3451 -1025.94 
VC Age  (0.000) (0.927) (0.000)  (0.039)  (0.143)  (0.000)  (0.742)  (0.000)     
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 9 
 Survivorship Test for Above Median Reputation VC (VC Rep =1) versus Below Median Reputation VC (VC Rep =0) - 1985 -1996 
 
Table 9 presents the accelerated failure time model (AFT) regression coefficients and in parentheses its associated p-values based on maximum likelihood 
estimation method using Newton-Raphson algorithm for convergence and the individual coefficient estimates tested using a χ
2-statistic. The simplified linear 
representation of the regression specification:  
Where Ln(Ht) is natural logarithm of the time to delisting of the individual companies in years,
) ) ( 1 (
) ( ) (
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ρ
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λ λρ
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t t H
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−
,
β λ
X e = ,  σ ρ / 1 =  and t is 
the individual sample time to failure in years. The VC_Reputation is a binary variable that equals 1 if VC reputation proxy measurement > median VC reputation 
proxy measurement and 0 otherwise. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, VC IPO Share and VC Age) and the control variables as regressants 
(Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech, Roadshow and Bcycle) are defined in Appendix A. The regressions are estimated over 478 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 
1985-1996 period. 
  VC Rep  UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH ROADSHOW  BCYCLE  INTERCEPT  Ancillary 
Scale, σ  Log Likelihood 
Model 1  0.1049*** 0.0215*** -0.0019***  0.0038***  0.0271  -0.0391*  -0.0309  2.7636***  0.0982 -369.10 
VC Market Share  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.229)  (0.091)  (0.599)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 2  0.0411** 0.0300***  -0.0020***  0.0049***  0.0272  -0.0379**  -0.0337  2.7385***  0.1017 -358.99 
VC IPO Share  (0.048) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.246)  (0.015)  (0.578)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 3  -0.1511*** 0.0260*** -0.0016***  0.0056***  0.0326  -0.0293**  -0.0566  2.8536***  0.0931 -385.53 
VC Age  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.126)  (0.047)  (0.315)  (0.000)     
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 10 
 Survivorship Test for Above Median Reputation VC (VC Rep =1) versus Below Median Reputation VC (VC Rep =0) - 1997 -2007 
 
Table 10 presents the accelerated failure time model (AFT) regression coefficients and in parentheses its associated p-values based on maximum likelihood 
estimation method using Newton-Raphson algorithm for convergence and the individual coefficient estimates tested using a χ
2-statistic. The simplified linear 
representation of the regression specification:  
Where Ln(Ht) is natural logarithm of the time to delisting of the individual companies in years,
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X e = ,  σ ρ / 1 =  and t is 
the individual sample time to failure in years. The VC_Reputation is a binary variable that equals 1 if VC reputation proxy measurement > median VC reputation 
proxy measurement and 0 otherwise. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, VC IPO Share and VC Age) and the control variables as regressants 
(Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech, Roadshow and Bcycle) are defined in Appendix A. The regressions are estimated over 953 VC-backed IPOs completed in the 
1997-2007 period. 
  VC Rep  UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH ROADSHOW  BCYCLE  INTERCEPT  Ancillary 
Scale, σ  Log Likelihood 
Model 1  -0.0118 -0.0037  -0.0029***  0.0003  -0.0053  0.1549***  0.0194  1.8889***  0.3627 -766.01 
VC Market Share  (0.774) (0.826) (0.000)  (0.926)  (0.912)  (0.000)  (0.872)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 2  -0.0948 -0.0087  -0.0027***  -0.0011  -0.0054  0.1554***  0.0126  1.9574***  0.3626 -763.42 
VC IPO Share  (0.221) (0.6037) (0.000)  (0.698)  (0.909)  (0.000)  (0.9167)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 3  -0.2808*** 0.0024 -0.0027***  0.0006  -0.0068  0.1546***  -0.0194  1.9860***  0.3550 -741.09 
VC Age  (0.000) (0.883) (0.000)  (0.839)  (0.884)  (0.000)  (0.8711)  (0.000)     
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 11 
 Survivorship Test for Top Quartile Reputation VC (VC Rep =1) versus Lowest Quartile Reputation VC (VC Rep = 0) - 1985 -2007 
 
Table 11 presents the accelerated failure time model (AFT) regression coefficients and in parentheses its associated p-values based on maximum likelihood 
estimation method using Newton-Raphson algorithm for convergence and the individual coefficient estimates tested using a χ
2-statistic. The simplified linear 
representation of the regression specification:  
Where Ln(Ht) is natural logarithm of the time to delisting of the individual companies in years,
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the individual sample time to failure in years. The VC_Reputation is a binary variable that equals 1 if the VC reputation proxy measurement is within top quartile 
reputation VC scale and 0 if the VC reputation proxy measurement is within lowest quartile reputation VC scale. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, 
VC IPO Share and VC Age) and the control variables as regressants (Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech, Roadshow and Bcycle) are defined in Appendix A. The 
regressions are estimated over 711VC-backed IPOs filtered for the regression requirement and completed in the 1985-2007 period. 
  VC Rep  UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH ROADSHOW  BCYCLE  INTERCEPT  Ancillary 
Scale, σ  Log Likelihood 
Model 1  0.1855*** -0.0104 -0.0047***  0.0023  0.0642  0.0860**  -0.0648  2.4188***  0.3765 -533.04 
VC Market Share  (0.000) (0.549) (0.000)  (0.480)  (0.249)  (0.013)  (0.637)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 2  0.1131** -0.0084  -0.0041***  0.0057*  0.0750  0.0621**  0.0093  2.4257***  0.3395 -524.01 
VC IPO Share  (0.015) (0.579) (0.000)  (0.077)  (0.152)  (0.046)  (0.950)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 3  -0.6181*** 0.0187 -0.0050***  -0.0032  0.0007  0.1130***  -0.1635  2.6931***  0.3824 -520.25 
VC Age  (0.000) (0.299) (0.000)  (0.358)  (0.991)  (0.001)  (0.2876)  (0.000)     
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parentheses. 
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 Survivorship Test for 3rd Quartile Reputation VC (VC Rep =1) versus 2nd Quartile Reputation VC (VC Rep = 0) - 1985 -2007 
 
Table 11 presents the accelerated failure time model (AFT) regression coefficients and in parentheses its associated p-values based on maximum likelihood 
estimation method using Newton-Raphson algorithm for convergence and the individual coefficient estimates tested using a χ
2-statistic. The simplified linear 
representation of the regression specification:  
Whe
re 
Ln(Ht) is natural logarithm of the time to delisting of the individual companies in years,
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X e = ,  σ ρ / 1 =  and t is the 
individual sample time to failure in years. The VC_Reputation is a binary variable that equals 1 if the VC reputation proxy measurement is within third quartile 
reputation VC scale and 0 if the VC reputation proxy measurement is within lowest quartile reputation VC scale. The VC reputation proxies (VC Market Share, 
VC IPO Share and VC Age) and the control variables as regressants (Underwriter, Size, Age, Tech, Roadshow and Bcycle) are defined in Appendix A. The 
regressions are estimated over 721VC-backed IPOs filtered for the regression requirement and completed in the 1985-2007 period. 
  VC Rep  UNDERWRITER  SIZE  AGE  TECH ROADSHOW  BCYCLE  INTERCEPT  Ancillary 
Scale, σ  Log Likelihood 
Model 1  0.1054** -0.0259  -0.0071***  0.0055  0.0604  0.1339***  0.0097  2.2171***  0.3371 -544.37 
VC Market Share  (0.018) (0.175) (0.000)  (0.108)  (0.238)  (0.000)  (0.9546)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 2  0.0267 -0.0036  -0.0079***  0.0063**  0.0765*  0.1619***  -0.0316  2.3981***  0.3283 -548.72 
VC IPO Share  (0.485) (0.806) (0.000)  (0.026)  (0.055)  (0.000)  (0.792)  (0.000)     
                   
Model 3  -0.1736*** -0.0222 -0.0037***  0.0039  0.0812*  0.1154***  0.1139  2.3794***  0.2909 -531.54 
VC Age  (0.000) (0.1612) (0.000)  (0.157)  (0.062)  (0.000)  (0.3897)  (0.000)     
*,**,*** denote coefficient estimates significantly differ from zero at 10,5 and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parentheses. 
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 Industry Composition for Venture Backed High Tech and Non High Tech IPOs (1985-2007), Sample Size = 1876 IPOs
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IPO Delisting Frequency By Quarter for Venture Backed IPOs (1985 -2007), Sample Size = 1876 IPOs 
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Figure 3(a)-(c) 
Cumulative density function (CDF) curves estimated from the AFT modeling for 1985-2007, 
Sample size =1431 IPOs (Matches Test in Table 8) 
 
Figure 3(a) Comparison By VC Market Share as Reputation Proxy 
 
 
Figure 3(b) Comparison By VC IPO Share as Reputation Proxy   
 
 
Figure 3(c) Comparison By VC Age as Reputation Proxy  97
 
Figure 4(a)-(c) 
Cumulative density function (CDF) curves estimated from the AFT modeling for 1985-1996, 
Sample size = 478 IPOs (Matches Test in Table 9) 
 
Figure 4(a) Comparison By VC Market Share as Reputation Proxy  
          
 
Figure 4(b) Comparison By VC IPO Share as Reputation Proxy 
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Figure 5(a)-(c) 
Cumulative density function (CDF) curves estimated from the AFT modeling for 1996-2007,  
Sample size = 953 IPOs (Matches Test in Table 10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5(a) Comparison By VC Market Share as Reputation Proxy 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5(b) Comparison By VC IPO Share as Reputation Proxy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5(c) Comparison By VC Age as Reputation Proxy  99
 
Figure 6(a)-(c) 
Cumulative density function (CDF) curves estimated from the AFT modeling for 1985-2007 for top and 
bottom quartile VC reputation IPOs , Sample size = 711 IPOs (Matches Test in Table 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6(a) Comparison By VC Market Share as Reputation Proxy       
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6(b) Comparison By VC IPO Share as Reputation Proxy   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6(c) Comparison By VC Age as Reputation Proxy  100
Figure 7(a)-(c) 
Cumulative density function (CDF) curves estimated from the AFT modeling for 1985-2007 for third 
and second quartile VC reputation IPOs , Sample size = 721 IPOs (Matches Test in Table 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7(a) Comparison By VC Market Share as Reputation Proxy        
 
 
 Figure 7(b) Comparison By VC IPO Share as Reputation Proxy 
 
 
Figure 7(c) Comparison By VC Age as Reputation Proxy 